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DEDICATION
To my parents and maternal grand parents who supported and loved me unconditionally
in the toughest journey of my life. To my teachers who never stopped believing in me. To
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joy everyday.
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays in Access-Based Beliefs
by
Vinayak Alladi
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California San Diego, 2019
Professor Charles Sprenger, Chair
Professor James Andreoni, Co-Chair
This dissertation studies a notion called access-based beliefs, the idea that access to
an alternative has a direct impact on beliefs of its value. As an example, individual’s may
lower their beliefs of alternatives to which they have low access, a phenomenon colloquially
known as sour grapes. Using multiple settings in the lab and field, I demonstrate existence
of access-based beliefs consistent with the sour grapes hypothesis and provide evidence for
how it may be prevalent in real-world settings with an emphasis on the poor. In chapter 1,
in an environment where learning channels are controlled for, I provide a proof-of-concept
of access-based beliefs, showing that lower access to a subjective lottery reduces revealed
xiv
beliefs of its value. In chapter 2, I study access-based beliefs in a real-world setting. I
show that lowering access to a real-world investment (an SAT prep package) lowers beliefs
of its expected effectiveness and reduces investment in it amongst a subsample of the
population that would be expected to have the highest demand for it. In chapter 3, I
explore the notion of relative access, that is, the value of an alternative is a function of
whether or not others possess it. I find that a small but significant portion of individuals
display a preference for conformity or non-conformity in consumption based on the societal
distribution.
xv
Chapter 1
Access-Based Beliefs: Theory and
Lab Evidence
1.1 Introduction
Standard economic theory has traditionally held that beliefs are only a function of
information (Aumann, 1976; Harsanyi, 1968) and that beliefs about an alternative’s value
are independent of the probability of it being in the choice set (Savage, 1954). The latter
condition, i.e. separability, is a core assumption of the canonical model of decision-making
under uncertainty, expected utility (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). If one defines
access generally and parsimoniously as the probability that an alternative will be in the
choice set,1 then the above assumptions imply that any relationship between access and
beliefs can exist only indirectly, through learning.2
In contrast, a growing theoretical literature on motivated cognition challenges
the traditional view, arguing that beliefs can be self-serving (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2016)
and that beliefs of a parameter may depend on how likely it is to be payoff relevant
(Be´nabou and Tirole, 2011). Existing evidence to suggest a relationship between access
and beliefs comes in the form of experimental work from outside economics which finds
1Access could be defined in other ways, e.g., as the price of an alternative. However, this may lead to
additional complications like wealth effects.
2Increased access could lead to more experience with an alternative, or could facilitate Bayesian
updating about its value.
1
that the desirability of an alternative may be a function of its accessibility. However, these
studies fail to adequately control for learning (Kay, Jimenez, and Jost, 2002) and use
un-incentivized desirability ratings to study an alternative’s value (Pyszczynski, 1982).
This paper presents the first deliberate exploration in economics of the relationship
between access and beliefs. It defines access-based beliefs using decision-theory which helps
to formalize phenomena described colloquially as “sour grapes” and ”grass is greener”.
It improves upon prior empirical work from other disciplines by creating a decision
environment in the lab that precludes learning, and by adopting a belief elicitation method
that is based on incentivized choices. It then shows that the access-based beliefs empirically
demonstrated in this paper are predicted by a special class of models in motivated cognition
that combine anticipatory utility and reference dependence.
Access-based beliefs is defined as beliefs of an alternative’s value that depend
on the probability it will be in the choice set. As an example, individuals may avoid
disappointment by lowering beliefs of alternatives to which they have low access, a
phenomenon commonly known as “sour grapes”. Such a mechanism could have significant
economic effects. For instance, Anyon (1997) uses in-depth case-studies to argue that poor
people have pessimistic outlooks on the value of schooling due to the difficulty of gaining
access, a mechanism that ultimately impacts educational outcomes. Kay, Jimenez, and
Jost (2002) find that lowering the perceived probability of a candidate winning an election
reduces desirability of that outcome. In contrast, studies in marketing show that increasing
the perceived inaccessibility of products can increase their desirability and demand (Lynn,
1989; Verhallen, 1982), which can be termed as “the grass-is-greener effect”.3
In a lab setting that precludes learning, I consider a between-subjects design in
which participants are randomly assigned a low (10%) or high (70%) chance of obtaining a
subjective lottery with an unknown distribution over two outcomes. Before uncertainty is
3Conventionally, sour grapes and grass-is-greener are considered ex-post phenomena. I explore the
ex-ante version, before uncertainty resolves, so that it may influence payoff-relevant decisions. Readers
can therefore also interpret the theory as anticipatory sour grapes (grass-is-greener).
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realized, subjects are asked to make a series of contingent choices between the subjective
lottery and a collection of objective lotteries (with known distributions) of increasing
expected value. The indifference point measures the participant’s valuation of the subjective
lottery, and under a subjective expected utility model (SEU), I infer the beliefs of the
subjective lottery.4 The null hypothesis, from expected utility and other models of
ambiguity, is that there should be no difference in the average implied beliefs between the
low and high access conditions. The alternate hypothesis is access-based beliefs, which
predicts a difference. The lab experiment was conducted at two locations, UC San Diego
and Christ College in Bangalore, India.
The results of the lab experiment are consistent with the existence of access-based
beliefs in the direction of sour grapes. Lowering access to the subjective lottery by 60
p.p. reduces mean beliefs of a high payout by 2.6 p.p. and is significant at the 10% level.
This represents an approximately 0.2 standard deviation shift in mean beliefs between the
high and low conditions, and translates to a 3.3% expected reduction in dollar earnings
calculated using the average baseline beliefs of 50% observed in the data. An examination
of the distribution of beliefs for high and low access conditions shows that most of the
divergence occurs for implied beliefs of the high payout that are coherent under SEU,
meaning they are at least 50%.5 When I restrict the analysis to this relevant subsample,
which comprises 75% of the data, I find a slightly larger and more significant treatment
effect - a 60 p.p. reduction in access lowers beliefs by 3 p.p. on average and is significant
at conventional levels (p-values range from 0.024 to 0.096 depending on specification).6
To provide a theory for these findings, I propose an adaptation of the Brunnermeier
4More precisely, the indifference point is the subject’s probability equivalent of the subjective lottery
which allows me, under subjective expected utility, to calculate their implied belief (Andreoni, T. Schmidt,
and Sprenger, 2015).
5Under subjective expected utility (SEU), being allowed to choose the high-payout state implies that
beliefs less than 50% are incoherent, i.e., they do not sum to one. Under non-expected utility models
(Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji, 2005; Schmeidler and Gilboa, 2004), individuals may have coherent
beliefs but are averse to subjective uncertainty (ambiguity) and may inherently dislike the alternative.
6The Results section shows that there is no differential selection into this subsample by treatment.
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and Parker (BP) (2005) optimal-beliefs model to subjective lotteries. In BP, individuals
choose beliefs to maximize the tradeoff between anticipation of pleasant future outcomes
and the costs of self-delusion, resulting in beliefs of high-utility states that are overly
optimistic. I add another source of utility, reference dependence (where the reference point
is the expected outcome under the chosen beliefs), which allows individuals to modify their
beliefs to avoid disappointment. This addition creates a tradeoff between anticipatory
utility and reference dependence which can account for both optimistic and pessimistic
beliefs of the subjective lottery as access to it changes.7 The model predicts a sour-grapes
effect under parameter assumptions consistent with past experimental work. It can also
predict grass-is-greener effects under more extreme assumptions, which the standard BP
model cannot do.
This paper contributes to several literatures. First, a key property of models in
motivated cognition, including BP, and other models of anticipatory utility, is that beliefs
about a parameter should depend on how likely it is to be payoff-relevant. Coutts (2015)
shows in the lab that lowering the payoff gained from an event lowers beliefs of the event’s
likelihood. I show lab evidence of the converse, i.e., lowering the likelihood of an alternative
lowers beliefs of its payout, and demonstrate theoretically that such sour grapes is an
implication of these canonical models. As such, access-based beliefs can be viewed as a
consequence of optimal belief models which have the above-mentioned property.
By studying access-based beliefs as a two-stage lottery with a subjective lottery
as an outcome, this paper serves as one of the first tests between models of subjective
uncertainty (ambiguity) and models of motivated cognition. The former maintain that
beliefs of the subjective lottery do not change unless new information arises and are
agnostic about where priors come from (Savage, 1954; Schmeidler and Gilboa, 2004). They
also often predict an aversion to subjective lotteries, which could increase with a higher
7This tradeoff is also explored in Sarver (2012) which models optimally chosen reference points. I
discuss similarities and differences between the two in the last section of the paper.
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likelihood of access (Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji, 2005). By contrast, my findings
suggest instead that beliefs may change without new information, and that implied beliefs
are increasing with greater access to the subjective lottery in a potentially self-serving way.
Ultimately, they suggest that models of ambiguity may be missing elements of motivated
cognition that might matter for decision-making under uncertainty.
Access-based beliefs relates to the endowment effect, the finding that individuals
place a higher value on goods they possess (Kahneman, Knetsch, and R. H. Thaler, 1991; R.
Thaler, 1980) or goods they are likely to possess (Ericson and Fuster, 2011; Heffetz and List,
2014). Similarly, this paper explores how varying the likelihood that a subjective lottery
pays out impacts its valuation. An obvious question is whether or not the lab portion of
this paper is simply a special case of past endowment effect experiments. However, this
is not the case; I show that the standard model used to explain the endowment effect,
i.e. reference dependence, when applied to this study, does not predict an effect.8 While
a higher chance of the subjective lottery (and therefore, of the high payout) raises the
reference point, choosing the subjective lottery more in the elicitation will not increase the
likelihood of the high payout since the outcomes in the subjective and objective lotteries
are identical.9
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 1.2, I discuss the experimen-
tal design and in Section 1.3, I present the theoretical predictions from standard models;
in Section 1.4, I present the results from the lab experiment and in Section 1.5, I propose
a model of optimal beliefs that could rationalize access-based beliefs. In Section 1.6, I
discuss the overall results of the paper and conclude with a discussion of the connection to
poverty and potential policy implications of access-based beliefs.
8The standard explanation of the endowment effect comes from reference dependence where outcomes
are treated as gains or losses with respect to a reference point. In this case, losing an object that one is
(likely to be) endowed with hurts more than gaining an object that one is not (likely to be) endowed with.
9Only when the outcomes in the subjective and objective lotteries are different can reference dependence,
specifically, Koszegi-Rabin (KR) (2006) reference dependence, predict the effect found in the lab.
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1.2 Experimental Design
1.2.1 Framework for Laboratory Exploration
I model access-based beliefs as a two-stage compound lottery. The first stage of
the lottery is objective and represents access to an alternative while the second stage is
subjective, and allows for beliefs over the value of an alternative.10 This paper focuses
on ex-ante beliefs before uncertain access to alternatives is resolved. Alternately, one
could explore ex-post beliefs, after uncertainty is resolved. However, if outcomes have been
determined and there are no longer any payoff relevant choices to be made then ex-post
beliefs arguably matter less except potentially for their impact on affective or psychological
states.
The primitives are a set of outcomes, {H,L} where H > L, a known probability
distribution in the first-stage, {α,1−α}, and the agent’s beliefs over the subjective
probability distribution in the second-stage, {p˜,1− p˜}. The first stage is an α chance
of a subjective lottery and a (1−α) chance of a fixed outside option, F (Figure 1.1).
Conditional on realizing the subjective lottery, there is a p˜ chance of a high paying outcome,
H and a (1− p˜) chance of low paying option, L.
Figure 1.1. Access-Based Beliefs as a Compound Lottery
A sour grapes effect is when a decrease in α leads individuals to become less
10A subjective lottery is one in which the possible outcomes are known but the distribution of outcomes
remains unknown.
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optimistic about the subjective lottery and lowers their beliefs of p˜. The grass-is-greener
effect would be the opposite response. As α decreases, individuals raise their beliefs of p˜
and the subjective lottery becomes more desirable.
1.2.2 Implementing Access-Based Beliefs in the Lab
Design Overview
The experimental design closely resembles the framework for access-based beliefs
outlined above. In a between-subjects design, the probability of obtaining the subjective
lottery is varied and a participant’s implied belief about its composition is elicited before
uncertainty is resolved but after they know their probability of obtaining it. The elicitation
measure used is the probability equivalent of the subjective lottery - a method borrowed
from Andreoni, T. Schmidt, and Sprenger (2015). With some probability (high or low)
subjects gain access to subjective lottery, with some probability they face an outside option,
and with some probability (fixed for both treatment groups) they are paid based on one
of the ex-ante choices they made.11
The details of the experiment are explained as follows: (1) how the subjective
lottery is represented and how the probability it obtains is varied (2) the choices subjects
make before the lottery is resolved and how beliefs are elicited from those choices (3) how
the choices are incentivized.
The Subjective Lottery
The subjective lottery is represented by an opaque JAR Beferred to as “JAR A”.
“JAR A” contains 20 red or green balls of unknown proportions. Subjects designate which
color pays $H and which pays $L.12
11The choices can be thought of as contingent or conditional choices meaning, with some probability,
they matter in the decision tree.
12Subjects make this choice to avoid any suspicion that the experiment is rigged against them as they
might believe the jar is purposefully filled with a low number of winning balls.
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Implementing Uncertain Access to the Lottery
Access to the subjective lottery is determined by a first-stage objective lottery in
which subjects select 1 of N sealed envelopes, each containing a single card that determines
access, and ultimately, the subject payments. The distribution of the envelope’s contents
is known to subjects:
1. α ·N of the N envelopes contain a card that says “JAR A’ ’ =⇒ Drawing such a
card means that a participant’s payout will be determined by a random draw of a
ball from the subjective jar. Depending on the color of the drawn ball and the color
they chose to be the winning color, they will be paid.13
2. (1−α) ·N of the N envelopes contain a card that says “F’ ’ =⇒ Drawing such a
card means that subjects get a fixed payout, F .
Eliciting Beliefs
Beliefs of the subjective lottery are elicited through incentivized choices before the
lottery is carried out but after the participant knows the chances she faces.14 Importantly,
the subjective lottery (JAR A) over which subjects have their beliefs elicited is the same
subjective lottery (JAR A) to which access is varied. Specifically, each participant’s
probability (uncertainty) equivalent of the subjective lottery is measured. Using a multiple
price list (MPL),15 I find out the probability of $H that would make them indifferent to
the subjective lottery as described below.
The left-side is a subjective lottery which was described in the previous section,
“JAR A”. The right side is a 20-ball jar of known proportions (the objective prospect)
13For example, if green is chosen as the winning color and red is drawn, the participant gets the low
payment in the subjective lottery.
14The belief elicitation is incentivized by assigning a small probability that a participant’s payout from
the experiment is determined by a randomly chosen row of the MPL, following the convention of random
incentive mechanisms.
15The multiple price list with real payments in economics was motivated and popularized by Coller
and Williams, 1999, and Harrison, Lau, and Williams, 2002.
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and
 Green Marbles worth __ each
JAR B
Marbles
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Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
Figure 1.2. Multiple Price List over Subjective and Objective Lottery
containing yellow or black balls worth $H and $L0 respectively, referred to as “JAR
B”. Proportions vary from 20 yellow and 0 black to 0 yellow and 20 black and for each
row, subjects indicate whether they prefer a draw from the subjective or objective jar
by checking the appropriate box. The point subjects switch from the left side(subjective
lottery) to the right side (objective lottery) reveals their indifference point between the
two options.16
To infer beliefs from these choices, I apply Subjective Expected Utility (SEU), the
canonical model of decision-making under uncertainty in the literature. SEU states that
individuals evaluate a subjective lottery according to the weighted sum of the utility of
each outcome in the lottery, where the weights are the subjective probability that the
outcome occurs.17 Under SEU, the indifference point reveals to us the implied beliefs of
16Because the MPL is discrete and one of the lotteries must be selected as the preferred lottery, I can
only identify their indifference point over an interval.
17That is, individuals apply expected utility to subjective lotteries, and are probabilistically sophis-
ticated, meaning they have subjective probabilities of the outcomes that sum to one (see section 3 for
details of SEU).
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the subjective lottery. Let p˜ be the subjective probability of the number of high paying
balls in the subjective lottery, q be the probability of a high paying ball in the objective
lottery, and u be any well-behaved utility function. At the indifference point, the following
equation holds:
Expected Utility of the Subjective Lottery = Expected Utility of the Objective Lottery
p˜ ·u(H) + (1− p˜) ·u(L) = q∗ ·u(H) + (1− q∗) ·u(L0)
p˜= q∗u(H)−u(L0)
u(H)−u(L) +
u(L0)−u(L)
u(H)−u(L) (1.1)
where q∗ is the probability of the objective lottery at the indifference point. Notice
that if L= L0, then p˜= q∗, meaning beliefs can be directly calculated without knowing
the shape of the function u(), i.e. without assumptions on risk aversion.
Incentivizing Belief Elicitation Task
In order to incentivize the choices that subjects make, there are two additional
envelopes so that subjects are actually choosing from 1 out of (N + 2) envelopes as opposed
to 1 out of N. These 2 envelopes contain a card that says ”Task”. Drawing such a card
means that a random row from the belief elicitation task is chosen, and the participant
is paid according to a drawn ball from the jar they preferred for that row.18 Denote “R”
as the probability a subject’s payout is determined by JAR A or the outside option, and
“(1−R)” as the probability it is determined by the elicitation task. The complete decision
tree subjects faced is illustrated in Figure 1.3.
18This is known as a random incentive mechanism - a method commonly used in the experimental
literature and in experiments with subjective lotteries (Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv, 2007; Halevy, 2007).
Appendix ?? examines the incentive compatibility of the mechanism for this experiment.
10
Figure 1.3. Complete Decision Tree
The distribution of envelopes is as follows:
• R ·α proportion of envelopes are ”JAR A” =⇒ a payment from the subjective jar.
• R · (1−α) proportion of envelopes are “$F” =⇒ a fixed payment of $F
• (1−R) proportion of envelopes are “TASK” =⇒ a payment from a randomly chosen
row of the elicitation task according to a drawn ball from the preferred jar for that
row.
Final Design, Timing and Procedures
The timing of the experiment is as follows: in Step 1, subjects choose, but do not
open, one of 10 envelopes in front of them. In Step 2, subjects make their choices on the
multiple-price list and in Step 3, envelopes are opened and payments are made based on
the envelope contents. Importantly, subjects are aware of the full experimental procedure,
including the distribution of envelope contents and how their payments will be determined,
before they make their choices.
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With this procedural setup, a between-subjects design with two access conditions
was implemented as follows: 19
1. High Access Condition: 7 envelopes say “JAR A”, 1 envelope says “F” and 2
envelopes say “Task”
2. Low Access Condition: 1 envelope says “JAR A” , 7 envelopes say “F’ and 2
envelopes say ”Task”
A crucial feature was to make the chance that the elicitation pays out constant
across both groups so that any differences in beliefs could not be explained by differential
incentives to do the task or a differential probability of obtaining the objective lottery.20
Two design choices were made with the thought they would increase the psycho-
logical conditions under which access-based beliefs are more likely to be observed: (1)
Subjects choose, but do not open, one of the envelopes at the start of the experiment
so that it sits with them for a while. Subjects are also asked to write the letter ”Y” on
the envelope they chose, and the letter ”N” on the envelopes they did not choose. (2) I
gradually increase the attractiveness of the subjective lottery relative to the outside option
and to the objective lottery under the prediction that doing so will increase the size of
access-based beliefs. As a result, three versions of the experiment are tested in this paper:
1. Version 1 of our experiment has only two outcomes, H and L, where the fixed outside
option, F, also equals L. This allows us to calculate beliefs without any assumptions
on risk aversion.
19A within-subjects design was also considered where beliefs would be elicited twice for the same
person at different access levels. This could increase statistical power by controlling for potentially large
heterogeneity in beliefs, however, this could generate very little variation in beliefs, as individuals may not
change their responses on an identical elicitation task. Furthermore, if responses did change it may also
be hard to rule out miscomprehension of the task.
20An alternate design considered was varying the probability of access to the subjective lottery without
an outside option. While perhaps simpler to explain, this would also change the incentives to do the
elicitation and it would change access to the objective lottery in the elicitation as well, thus adding
potential confounds.
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Table 1.1. Versions of Experiment
JAR A (subjective lottery) JAR B (objective lottery) Fixed Payout
Version 1 H and L H and L0 = L F = L
Version 2 H and L H and L0 = L F ¡ L
Version 3 H and L H and L0 < L F ¡ L
2. Version 2 of the experiment maintains only two outcomes in the elicitation task
(the MPL) but changes the outside option to a lower value, L0 < L. This increases
the attractiveness of JAR A relative to the outside option and still allows you to
calculate implied beliefs without any more assumptions.
3. Version 3 of our experiment is the strongest version in terms of creating the feeling
of low access to a desirable alternative. As in version 2, the outside option is lowered,
but in addition, the low payment of the objective lottery is reduced to L0 < L. This
further increases the attractiveness of JAR A relative to the outside option as the
outcomes in the objective lottery are now weakly dominated by the subjective one.
However, this necessitates some assumptions on risk aversion discussed in the Results
section.21
1.3 Theoretical Predictions from Standard Models
1.3.1 Subjective Expected Utility
The canonical model for decision-making under ambiguity (subjective lotteries)22 is
Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) (Anscombe and Aumann, 1963) which has the following
primitives: A finite state space S, a set of consequences X, a set of objective probability
21For the analysis, pooled and separate results from all three versions are presented, and the hypothesis
that increasing the attractiveness of the subjective lottery from version 1 to 3 generates a larger effect is
tested.
22When referring to the experiment, I use the term “subjective lottery”; when referring to existing
theory, I use either “ambiguity” or subjective lottery, but these terms are interchangeable.
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distributions over consequences ∆(X), and a set of acts F , functions which map S into
∆(X). Individuals have preferences over acts in F . If these preferences satisfy the axioms
of completeness, transitivity, monotonicity, continuity, independence and non-degeneracy,
they can be represented by a Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) functional. For a given
act, a:
USEU (a) =
∫
S
p(s)u(a(s))ds (1.2)
where p(s) is the subjective probability associated with state s ∈ S, ∫S p(s)ds = 1 and
u(a(s)) is the (von Neumann-Morgenstern) expected utility of the lottery that act a yields
in state s.
As can be seen in (2), SEU is linear in the probabilities (a consequence of the
independence axiom)23 which implies that a change in the probability of an outcome does
not influence how the outcome is valued. In other words, for the compound lottery in
Figure 1.1, a change in α does not impact the valuation of the subsequent subjective
lottery. This means that access-based beliefs are inconsistent with SEU.
1.3.2 Non-SEU Ambiguity Models
There are other prominent models in the ambiguity literature which relax the
independence axiom (Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji, 2005; Schmeidler and Gilboa,
2004). However, these models mostly focus on rationalizing the Ellsberg paradox, the
finding that individuals have preferences which reflect an aversion to ambiguous lotteries.
The Smooth-Ambiguity model of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) predicts that
as exposure to the ambiguous lottery increases the individual becomes more averse to
ambiguity, a finding consistent with the grass-is-greener hypothesis. None of the above
models would predict sour grapes unless changes to the underlying assumptions are made.
23Independence axiom: For any three acts a,b,c ∈ F and for any α ∈ (0,1),a% b ⇐⇒ αa+ (1−α)c%
αb+ (1−α)c
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1.3.3 Reference Dependence
Reference dependence (Markowitz (1952) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991)) is
a model in which outcomes are treated as gains or losses with respect to some reference
point, with losses being felt more intensely than commensurate gains. The aversion to
expected loss has been used to explain why individuals with a low expectation of receiving
a consumption good lower their valuation of it (Ericson and Fuster, 2011; Heffetz and
List, 2014). In comparison, access-based beliefs examine changes in implied beliefs of an
alternative’s value caused by changes in the likelihood of possession, where the alternative
is a lottery as opposed to a consumption good. As such, the rationalization of loss aversion
around a reference point cannot explain access-based beliefs because the identified channel
is a change in beliefs (or preferences) exclusively over the subjective lottery and not
tradeoffs between different sources of gain-loss utility.24
1.3.4 Motivated Cognition
Models in motivated cognition suggest that beliefs enter the utility function directly
and can be chosen in a self-serving way. The Brunnermeier and Parker (BP) (2005)
optimal beliefs model posits that individuals choose beliefs (probabilities) to maximize the
tradeoff between anticipation of pleasant future outcomes (anticipatory utility) and the
costs of self-delusion. BP predicts higher beliefs of an argument that is more likely to be
payoff relevant. Adapted to subjective lotteries, BP would predict that a lower chance of
a pleasant, subjective lottery would lead to lower (but still inflated) beliefs, thus going in
24Unless the model treats subjective lotteries as a consumption object (a pen or mug, for example),
I demonstrate that no reference dependence model can fully explain access-based beliefs in the case of
two-outcome lotteries (Appendix 1.7.3) I examine three cases of reference dependence (1) the reference
is fixed at some value r > 0 (2) the referent is the expected value of the gamble and (3) the referent is
stochastic as in the case of Koszegi-Rabin (KR) (2006). I show that in all three cases the optimal report
of the agent in the MPL is equal to her true beliefs of the subjective lottery and does not vary with access.
The exception is that when there are three outcomes in the lottery, KR reference dependence could explain
the behavior. Also, for extreme parameter values, such as unreasonably large loss aversion assumptions,
reference dependence predicts that changes in access can move optimal beliefs, not marginally, but to the
boundaries.
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the direction of sour grapes.25
Table 1.2. Predictions of Different Models
Model Prediction on Reason for
choices if α
changes
prediction
Subjective Expected Utility No Effect Valuation is linear in probabili-
ties
Gilboa-Schmeidler Max-Min No Effect Valuation is linear in probabili-
ties
KMM Smooth ambiguity Grass-is-greener Individuals are ambiguity
averse
Reference Dependence No Effect No incentives to change choice
Motivated Cognition Sour Grapes Individuals have anticipatory
utility. Low access leads to
lower, but still inflated beliefs
1.4 Results
I first present results from the lab experiment (Section 1.4.1) , and then proceed to
the field experiment (Section 1.4.2), and finally, to a discussion of the heterogeneity of the
1.4.1 Data Collection
The experiment was conducted in two locations, the University of California,
San Diego (UCSD) and Christ University in Bangalore, India (CUB). Data collection
procedures were the same in both places. Sessions were conducted on undergraduates in
large universities from a variety of majors and recruiting procedures were identical. Out
of 34 lab sessions, 18 sessions were conducted at UCSD and 12 sessions at CUB. Version 1
and 3 were conducted at UCSD while version 2 and 3 was conducted at CUB. I conduct
25In section 5, I show how adding reference dependence to the standard BP model allows beliefs
to be optimally pessimistic. The model predicts a sour grapes effect under most reasonable parameter
assumptions, which is consistent with my experimental findings, but is capable of predicting grass-is-greener
under more extreme parameter assumptions, which the standard BP model cannot do.
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pooled analysis for the main treatment effects including a fixed effect for location, and
then separate analysis by location in the section on heterogeneity.26
1.4.2 Calculating Implied Beliefs
The outcome of interest for treatment effects analysis is the implied beliefs of the
subjective lottery. Under SEU, the implied beliefs can be calculated from the indifference
point on the elicitation task (the MPL). From eq (1) in section 2.2.4, when the researcher
knows the exact indifference point, q∗ = p˜. However, in practice, the MPL is discrete.
A 1-row change in the indifference point represents a 5% difference in beliefs, so as an
approximation, one can take the midpoint between two rows to measure beliefs.27 This
applies for versions 1 and 2 where both lotteries had the same outcomes.
In Version 3 of the experiment assumptions on risk aversion were made to calculate
implied beliefs.28 Without loss of generality, if L0 = 0, as in version 3, and u(0) = 0, the
belief to choice mapping is:
p= q∗ u(H)
u(H)−u(L) +
−u(L)
u(H)−u(L)
Notice that if one assumes greater risk aversion, i.e. a larger ratio of u(H)u(H)−u(L) , this
implies a larger change in the p (beliefs) holding q (the probability equivalent) constant.
Therefore, to be conservative in our estimates, I assume risk neutrality throughout, which
gives us a lower bound on the treatment effect.29 In the Results section I examine both
pooled and separate treatment effects by version.
26See appendix 1.7.4 for further comparisons between UCSD and India data.
27For example, switching one’s preference from the ambiguous to risky prospect between the 10th and
11th rows of the task sheet is coded as .475, since the implied belief is between .45 and .5. Switching one’s
preference from ambiguous to risky prospect between the 12th and 13th rows is similarly coded as .575.
28Another option could be to do a separate elicitation task, but this may make the entire set of decisions
more difficult to model.
29Appendix 1.7.5 provides further details of the mapping under different assumptions of risk aversion
using a power utility function.
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Dealing with Multiple Switchers
Multiple switchers, defined as subjects who fail to indicate a unique switch point in
the elicitation, is a general concern when using multiple price lists. In the US, the rate of
multiple switching was 16.6%, a similar rate to other experiments that employ the same
methodology.30 However, in India, the rate was considerably higher at 51.5%, possibly
because subjects had not been exposed to lab experiments before. As a result, to ensure
comprehension, a comprehension questionnaire was administered before beginning the
experiment for the Indian sample. For all treatment effects analysis, I remove multiple
switchers, since it is impossible to calculate an implied belief for them.31
One unexpected outcome in the Indian data was that the multiple switching differs
by treatment.32 Given that the treatment was randomized and that the effect remains
after controlling for observables, it suggests that this was an outcome of the treatment,
rather than selection on unobservables. One possible mechanism is that subjects with low
access concentrated on the instructions more, and this had an impact of reducing multiple
switching in the Indian sample where comprehension was lower and experience with the
task was less. Since there is no obvious theoretical link between higher concentration and
the sour grapes effect, there seems no obvious reason to interpret the treatment effects
any differently.
1.4.3 Sample Balance
No statistically significant differences are found between low and high access groups
on a set of participant demographics. This is true for the sample of non-multiple switchers
shown in the table below along with the full-sample of subjects, multiple switchers included,
30Such multiple switching is frequently found in multiple price list experiments and normally occurs
for 10-15% of subjects (Holt and Laury, 2002; Meier and Sprenger, 2010).
31As a robustness check, I include them for analysis at the individual-choice level.
32In a regression of an indicator for multiple switching on treatment, I find a lower rate of multiple
switching in the low access treatment of - 15.5 p.p. (p-value of .034) and after controlling for observables,
this drops to -13 p.p. and become just marginally significant (p-value .091).
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thus showing successful randomization.
Table 1.3. Sample Balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female Took Uncertainty Class Age Year of College Quantitative Major
Low Access 0.554 0.181 20.131 2.494 0.281
(0.040) (0.031) (0.162) (0.089) (0.036)
High Access 0.596 0.160 19.994 2.292 0.337
(0.039) (0.029) (0.151) (0.093) (0.037)
Observations 318 323 323 319 323
P-value Low = High 0.449 0.605 0.535 0.118 0.276
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01***. Each row shows the mean for that
demographic variable in the low and high access group respectively. The last row shows a t-test of the difference
in means. I find no significant different in means between the two groups.
1.4.4 Main Treatment Effects
The table below summarizes the outcome variable, ”beliefs”, for the full sample of
data. One cannot reject that mean beliefs of the high outcome are 50%.
Table 1.4. Summary of Dependent Variable: Beliefs
Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
beliefs .506 .152 .036 .964
The sample consists of all subjects who indicated a
unique switch-point in the multiple price list.
To provide a visual depiction of the treatment effects, I plot the distribution of
beliefs for low and high access conditions below (Figure 1.4). The figure illustrates a
shift in the distribution of the high access distribution to the right for beliefs greater
than 50%, while below 50%, the distributions look quite similar. I discuss why 50% is
a relevant partition of the data from a theoretical standpoint in the regression analysis
below. Although the difference in distributions above 50% is striking, a two-sample KS
test and a Wilcoxon rank-sum test fails to reject the equality of the overall distributions
with p-values of 0.18 and 0.11 respectively, likely reflecting a lack of power.
I next estimate average treatment effects using the estimating equation below:
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Figure 1.4. Kernel Density Estimates of Belief Distributions By Treatment
Beliefsi = α+β ·Low Accessi+γ ·xi+ν ·z+ i (1.3)
Beliefsi are the implied beliefs for individual i, Low Accessi is a binary indicator
for the treatment, the vector x are a set of demographic indicators and the vector z are a
set of fixed effects for experiment version (versions 1 to 3) and study location (UCSD vs.
India). The coefficient of interest is β.33
Table 1.5 presents the results of OLS estimation of equation (3). Column 1 shows
the average treatment effects without any controls. I find that low access reduces beliefs
by 2.6 p.p. on average from a baseline of 52 p.p. This represents a .16 standard deviation
shift in the belief distribution, and is significant at the 10% level (p-value of .100). When
33In all our analysis outliers are dropped. Outliers are defined as subjects who, when offered a choice
between the subjective lottery (with payouts of $30 and $10) and a certain payout of $30, choose the
subjective lottery. Similarly, I also consider as outliers subjects who, when offered a choice between the
subjective lottery and a certain payout of $10, prefer the certain payout. As a robustness check, I include
outliers in the analysis and find that this does not impact our main results.
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I control for participant demographics, experiment version, and study location (column
2) I find identical point estimates (2.6 p.p.) and levels of significance (p-value of .102).
These results suggest that the probability of obtaining the subjective lottery does impact
its valuation, and the effect goes in the direction of sour grapes (as opposed to the grass-
is-greener). The size of the effects in terms of expected economic value (in dollars) lost
is about $.78 on average, which translates to a 3.3% loss in expected winnings at mean
beliefs of 50%.
Columns 3 to 6 look at the treatment effects for a sample of subjects whose beliefs
were above and below 50%. This is the region in which the density plots of the high access
and low access distributions seem to diverge the most. This is a relevant cutoff to examine
because when subjects get to choose the winning color in the subjective lottery, beliefs
below 50% represent either: (A) a violation of SEU and coherent beliefs, as subjects could
have simply chosen the other color to be the winning color, and therefore, would have
increased their expected earnings given those beliefs,34 or (B) an aversion to ambiguity
(subjective lotteries). Either way, incoherent beliefs or an aversion to the subjective lottery
would be cases in which one may not expect to find access-based beliefs and, in particular,
sour grapes. Importantly, the treatment has no impact on the proportion of subjects who
violate SEU, which helps rule out selection on unobservables into this subsample.35
When treatment effects are analyzed for this subsample, similar effect sizes with
more precision are found. Low access reduces beliefs by 3 p.p. (p-value of .053) representing
a .2 standard deviation shift in the belief distribution (column 3) with similar results
when I control for observables (column 4). Columns 5 and 6 examine treatment effects for
beliefs below 50% without and with controls respectively and finds precise effect sizes of
34Another way of seeing the violation is that beliefs under 50% mean that subjects are probabilistically
unsophisticated, in that beliefs over the states of the world do not add up to one.
35See the rows in the first bottom panel of table 1.5 - the number of observations in high and low
access treatments below and above the cutoff shown is nearly equal; regressions in table 1.7.9, appendix
1.7.9 also confirm this result.
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0.36 Columns 7 to 10 examine treatment effects at a lower cutoff point, to ensure that
some subjects who may have had beliefs of exactly 50% are not excluded, a possibility
when using multiple price lists.37 At this cutoff, the treatment effect increases to 3.1 p.p.
(p-value of .024) (column 6) and is similar in magnitude and significance when controlling
for observables (column 7). Below 46%, the treatment effect is precisely 0 (columns 8 and
9).
As a robustness check, differential rates of multiple switching between the treatment
groups (17.9% lower multiple-switching in the low access group was driven by the Indian
portion of the study) was dealt with in three ways: (1) Calculate treatment effects for the
sample of subjects only at UCSD where there was no differential switching. (2) Construct
the Lee bounds for the treatment effects taking into account multiple switching.38 (3)
Perform choice-level analysis of the treatment effects using the entire data, including
multiple switchers, to look at the impact of treatment on the probability of choosing the
subjective lottery. I find that the treatment effects are robust to (1) and (3), but given
their size, it is unsurprising that they do not survive both sides of the Lee bounds (details
in appendix 1.7.7).
As noted, a hypothesis was that increasing the relative attractiveness of the
subjective lottery with respect to the outside option (version 1 to 2), and then with
respect to the objective lottery (version 2 to 3), would increase the sour grapes effect.
I test this hypothesis in columns 11 and 12 of table 1.5 under the same specification
as equation (1.3) by adding interaction terms between treatment and version number.
Furthermore, I find that increasing the relative attractiveness of the subjective lottery
does increase the sour grapes effect. The interaction terms between treatment and version
36In table 1.7.9, appendix 1.7.9 I calculate treatment effects on the actual row number at which subjects
switched rather than on beliefs for robustness. Overall, this has no impact on the main findings - the
treatment effects either increase or decrease, depending on the specification.
37Subjects who preferred the 50-50 objective lottery to the subjective lottery were recorded as having
beliefs of 47.5% (the midpoint between 45% and 50%.
38The Lee bounds are a trimming procedure to bound treatment effects when there is possible selection
(Lee, 2009).
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become increasingly negative, going from -1.5 p.p for version 1, -2.0 p.p. for version 2,
and -3.9 p.p. for version 3 but we are underpowered to detect these effects. Notably, the
interaction terms are always negative, though not individually significant, demonstrating
the consistency of sour grapes evidence across different versions of the experiment.
Overall, the main finding from our treatment effect analysis is a consistent sour
grapes effect in the range of 2.6% to 3.1% with p-values between .024 and .102 depending
on specification. These findings are robust to (1) many replications of the experiment
(over 30 sessions), (2) conducting the experiment in two different locations and (3) changes
in the participant payouts (from versions 1 to 3).
1.5 Access-Based Beliefs as Optimal Beliefs
In this section, an existing model is adapted to explain access-based beliefs and
capture observations from the lab. A candidate model needs to satisfy three criterion: (1)
It should predict that access to an alternative impacts beliefs of its value (2) It should
allow beliefs to be either optimistic or pessimistic relative to some true benchmark (3) It
should predict sour-grapes under some parameter values and grass-is-greener under others
since both directions are at least theoretically possible.
One candidate is the canonical model of optimal beliefs, Brunnermeier and Parker
(2005) (BP), which is capable of explaining access-based beliefs. In BP, beliefs are optimally
chosen to tradeoff two sources of utility: (1) anticipatory utility - the pleasure derived from
higher beliefs about future expected consumption (2) expected consumption utility - utility
derived from actual consumption. Importantly, optimal beliefs that deviate from the truth
can lead to lower real consumption by influencing choices. The model predicts that beliefs
of states in which consumption utility is high end up being inflated or optimistic. Stated
otherwise, beliefs of a parameter depend on the likelihood that the parameter is payoff
relevant. Applied to our setting, when the probability of the subjective lottery increases, an
24
individual has a greater incentive to inflate beliefs to raise anticipatory utility, experiencing
first-order gains from doing so, at the expense of second-order losses in expected outcomes.
However, a caveat to BP is that it cannot account for optimal beliefs being lower than
the truth (criterion 2) since anticipatory utility always pushes beliefs upwards and it also
cannot account for a grass-is-greener effect (criterion 3) since the marginal benefit to
increasing beliefs is always increasing in the level of access to the subjective lottery.
As a solution, I add reference dependence to standard BP, creating a tradeoff
between two psychological sources of utility, anticipation and gain-loss. This allows for
a richer set of predictions for how beliefs change with access. The relative strength of
anticipatory utility and loss aversion helps determine whether: (A) optimal beliefs are
lower or higher than true beliefs (criterion 2) (B) a sour grapes or grass-is-greener effect
is observed as the chance to obtain the subjective lottery increases (criterion 3). The
tension explored is similar to Sarver (2012) in which the individual optimally chooses
an arbitrary reference point to maximize the tradeoff between anticipatory utility and
gain-loss utility.39
1.5.1 Model
Consider a decision-maker (DM) who faces the following 2-stage decision problem.
In stage 1, the DM chooses a set of optimal beliefs to maximize long-run wellbeing and
in stage 2, the DM chooses actions to maximize expected consumption utility given
the optimal stage 1 beliefs. For simplicity, the model assumes that choices are made,
uncertainty is resolved, and all utility is experienced in one period.40 Denote p as the
individual’s true beliefs of a parameter, p˜ as optimally chosen beliefs of the same, and c as
39However, our model differs from Sarver in two crucial ways: (1) Instead of choosing an arbitrary
reference point, the reference point is dictated by the expected utility of the lottery under optimal beliefs
(2) Unlike in Sarver, the individual in our model considers the costs of self-delusion in terms of foregone
consumption.
40Access-based beliefs can be captured in a static setting. Adding a time dimension would not change
not change our results in any meaningful, qualitative way besides adding extra parameters.
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consumption. Let u(·) be an increasing, twice differentiable function over consumption.
Then, the agent’s long-run utility function is:
U = γ · Ep˜(u(c))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Anticipatory Utility
+ (1−γ)
[
θ · Ep(u(c))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Consumption Utility
+ (1− θ) · Ep[µ(u(c)|r)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gain-loss Utility
]
(1.4)
,where γ is the weight on anticipatory utility, θ(1−γ) is the weight on consumption utility
and (1− θ)(1−γ) is the weight on gain-loss utility. The first term, anticipatory utility
is denoted as Ep˜[u(c)], which is the expected utility evaluated under optimal beliefs. In
a world where this was the only source of utility, optimal beliefs would be those that
maximized the state in which consumption utility was highest. The second term, expected
consumption utility is denoted as Ep[u(c)] evaluated using true beliefs, p, which disciplines
beliefs from being completely optimistic. The third term, µ(u(c)|r), refers to gain-loss
utility which is the evaluation of outcomes as gains or loss with respect to a reference
point41. Since our model aims to capture the tradeoff between anticipatory utility and
gain-loss utility a natural choice for the reference point is the expected value of the lottery,
Ep˜[u(c)], which is directly affected by beliefs.42
The DM’s stage 1 maximization problem is to choose beliefs p˜ to maximize (1.4)
subject to the following constraints on beliefs: (1) p˜ ∈ [0,1] and (2) p˜+ (1− p˜) = 1.43
Constraint (1) says that beliefs are probabilities of states and therefore must be between 0
and 1. Constraint (2) says that the sum over all states must be equal to 1.
In stage 2, the DM makes choices q, given a set of beliefs, p˜, to maximize expected
consumption utility given by Ep˜[u(c)] where Ep˜ is the expectations operator under optimally
chosen beliefs from stage 1, and c = g(q(p˜)), that is, consumption is a function of the
41see appendix section 1.7.3 for a full description of reference dependence
42As I show in the online appendix - section 3 on reference dependence, when the reference point is
choice-acclimating the individual faces the strongest incentive to minimize gain-loss utility.
43Since there is no learning in our environment, one does not have to place other restrictions on optimal
beliefs that are assumed in BP, for example, that they following the law of iterated expectations.
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choices made under optimal beliefs. Trivially, optimal choices are q∗ = such that they
maximize expected consumption utility.
To derive predictions of the model, I use the context of the experiment. This
is a sufficiently general application that is portable to other contexts and allows us to
compare model predictions to the data. To refresh, the DM faces a compound lottery with
two outcomes, H and L.44 The compound lottery is an R ·α probability of obtaining the
subjective lottery, an R · (1−α) probability of the outside option, L and (1−R) is the
probability that choices made from a multiple price in which the DM chooses between the
subjective lottery and a series of objective lotteries are payoff relevant.
The choice variable q is defined as the indifference point on the MPL . An assumption
is that the DM chooses beliefs, p˜, over the subjective lottery but not over the objective
probabilities, which are R , α and those in the objective prospect, q. However, the
main predictions of the model would still remain if individuals were allowed to choose all
probabilities.45 The model also assumes that the DM evaluates subjective lotteries using
SEU, and thus reduces compound lotteries when calculating probabilities across objective
and subjective parts.
The model can be solved using backward induction: In stage 2, the DM chooses an
indifference point, q, given a set of beliefs, p˜, to maximize expected consumption utility
given by Ep˜[u(c))] where c= q(p˜). It can be shown trivially that q∗ = p˜ maximizes expected
consumption utility. In stage 1, the DM will choose beliefs, p˜, of the subjective lottery to
maximize long-run wellbeing in equation (1.4).
To distill the model’s essential prediction, i.e., how a change in α impacts p˜, a few
simplifying assumptions are made. One can eliminate consumption utility, which only
44Adding more outcomes simply increases the complexity of the expected value calculations, and
requires us to make assumptions on risk aversion, but does not change any of the theoretical results.
45If individuals could optimally choose both subjective and objective probabilities, this would lead
to similar results. For example, if the individual was maximizing anticipatory utility she would want to
believe that R= α= p˜= 1.
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serves to change the weight on the costs of self-delusion, by assuming θ = 0.46 Setting
L= 0 and λH = 1 and λL = λ to normalize loss aversion (both without loss of generality),
the objective function becomes:
U = γp˜H∆ + (1−γ)
[
(1−pH)λ ·−r+ (∆− r)pH
]
,where p˜H = probability of high outcome under optimal beliefs, pH = probability of high
outcome under true beliefs (where the optimal choice, q, is still determined by optimal
beliefs), and r is the reference point. Taking the derivate of the utility function with
respect to p˜ yields the following First Order Condition:
dp˜H
dp˜
· dU
dp˜H︸ ︷︷ ︸
Psychological Utility Tradeoff
+ dpH
dp˜
· dU
dpH︸ ︷︷ ︸
Costs of Self-Delusion
= 0 (1.5)
dp˜H
dp˜
·∆(γ− (1−γ)(λ(1−pH) +pH)) + dpH
dp˜
· (1−γ)(∆ + r(λ−1)) = 0 (1.6)
,where:
dp˜H
dp˜
=R ·α+ (1−R)p˜ (1.7)
dpH
dp˜
= (1−R) · (p− p˜) (1.8)
Equation (1.7) is the impact of changing p˜ on the probability of a high outcome
under optimal beliefs. Equation (1.7) illustrates two important points: (1) the marginal
impact of increasing beliefs p˜ on p˜H is always positive. (2) dp˜Hdp˜ is increasing in α which
shows that the marginal utility of higher beliefs is increasing in α. (1.8) represents the
46While it is conceptually interesting to view consumption and gain-loss utility separately, consumption
utility only changes the weight on the costs of self-delusion and so can be removed to simplify exposition
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penalty of moving optimal beliefs, p˜, away from the truth, p, in either direction. When
p˜ < p (p˜ > p), the derivative is positive (negative) and there is an incentive to increase
(decrease) p˜. The penalty also increases as the probability of the elicitation, (1−R), goes
up.
Equation (1.7) and (1.8) help us understand the first-order-condition in equation
(1.6), better. The first term in (1.6) is psychological utility and captures the tradeoff
between anticipatory and gain-loss utility. dp˜Hdp˜ is always positive, so the sign of the first
term depends on dUp˜H which depends on the relative strength between anticipatory utility
and gain-loss utility. A higher γ increases the weight on anticipatory utility relative to
gain-loss utility pushing beliefs higher. A higher λ increases loss aversion pushing beliefs
lower. If these were the only two forces in the model, optimal beliefs would be pulled to
the boundary of 0 or 1, depending on which force was stronger.47
The second additive term of equation (1.6) is the cost of self-delusion. dpHdp˜ represents
the penalty of moving beliefs away from the truth and, as long as individual’s are loss
averse (λ > 1), dUdpH is always positive. Thus, if the first term in equation (1.6) is positive,
i.e. anticipation outweighs gain-loss, then p˜ > p so that beliefs will be optimistic and
will increase as α is raised leading to a sour grapes effect. However, if the first term
is negative, and gain-loss utility outweighs anticipation (which does not occur under
reasonable assumptions as shown in simulations) then p˜ < p and beliefs decrease as α
increases leading to a grass-is-greener effect.48 This implies that sour grapes and grass is
greener are essentially a tradeoff between the relative weights of anticipatory utility and
loss aversion in the model. The F.O.C. is difficult to tract analytically but below I show
simulation results of optimal beliefs as α changes.
47Note that α also enters dUdp˜H through the pH term and utility is always increasing in α for λ > 1.48Note that this does not guarantee optimal beliefs will start at a higher level than true beliefs. For
that to occur, it would require unrealistic conditions on the parameters.
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1.5.2 Model Simulations of Sour Grapes and Grass is Greener
In this section I plot the utility function in (1.4) as a function of subjective beliefs,
p˜ for different values of α ranging from 0.125 to 0.875 in increments of 0.15. α = 0.125
and α = 0.875 are the actual values used in the experiment. For each plotted function I
label the utility maximizing belief. Through out I assume that the true probability of a
high outcome in the subjective lottery is p= 0.5.49
Figure 1.5 shows conditions under which sour grapes is predicted. The ratio of
losses to gains, λLλH = 2, which is considered a rule-of-thumb for what has been observed
empirically in the lab and the weight on consumption utility, θ, relative to gain-loss
utility is 0.4. Increasing θ further renders the effect of reference dependence on beliefs
non-existent. I assume the weight on anticipatory utility is γ = .5, which puts equal weight
on anticipatory utility relative to the combination of consumption and gain-loss utility.
When α moves from 0.125 to 0.875, as it does in our experiment, optimal beliefs move
from .42 to .746 . Unlike BP, I also reproduce the pattern that beliefs are pessimistic
(less than the true belief p= 0.5) at lower levels of α and become optimistic (greater than
p= 0.5) at higher levels of α. 50
Figure 1.6 shows conditions under which a grass-is-greener effect is predicted.
Almost all the assumptions required to observe such an effect are unreasonable. For
example, the weight on consumption utility, θ has to be close to 0 (in this case, exactly
0), for reference dependence to have any effect. The ratio of losses to gains has to
be considerably smaller than 2 as well, in this case, λLλH = 1.2, which does not fit most
experimental data. Finally, I maintain the assumption that γ = 0.5, as the effect is sensitive
49This is the expected belief if subjects thought that the jar was filled with green or red balls with
equal probability. In our experiment, subjects are told the jar is filled without instruction by someone
unaffiliated with the study.
50The impact of change in α on beliefs increases with α The intuition is as follows: At very low levels
of α, an increase or decrease in beliefs has little impact on anticipatory utility or the reference point, so
the optimal belief is governed mostly by the costs of self-delusion, thus leading optimal beliefs closer to
true beliefs. As α increases, the impact of optimal beliefs on psychological utility grows. As our design
only measures two levels α, high and low, I do not test for this non-monotonicity.
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Figure 1.5. Impact of Access on Beliefs Under Optimal Beliefs Model and Conditions
for Sour Grapes Effect
Above figure plots the utility function in (1.4) on the y-axis as a function of subjective beliefs, p˜, on the
x-axis, for different values of α For each plot, I label the utility maximizing beliefs in black. The figure
shows an example of parameter values under which the model predicts sour grapes. See text for details.
to changes of γ in either direction. Now when α moves from 0.125 to 0.875, optimal beliefs
move from .36 to .12. However, I do not find optimal beliefs greater than true beliefs at
low levels of α as might be expected for the grass-is-greener effect. In order to generate
this pattern, one would need to assume a λLλH < 1 , which would also be unreasonable given
most evidence. Overall, I find that the model predicts sour grapes for a more reasonable
set of parameter values, and this prediction fits with what was observed in the lab and
field.
1.6 Conclusion
Access-based beliefs are the idea that individuals formulate low beliefs about a
subjective prize in order to cope with a low probability of obtaining it. This notion could
have significant economic effects. For instance, poor people have pessimistic beliefs on the
value of schooling due to the difficulty of gaining access, a mechanism that could ultimately
reduce investment in education. A problem with testing such a theory in the real world is
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Figure 1.6. Impact of Access on Beliefs Under Optimal Beliefs Model and Conditions
for Grass-Is-Greener Effect.
Above figure plots the utility function in (1.4) on the y-axis as a function of subjective beliefs, p˜, on the
x-axis, for different values of α For each plot, I label the utility maximizing beliefs in black. The figure
shows an example of parameter values under which the model predicts grass-is-greener. See text for
details.
that there are potential learning confounds. For example, there may be reverse causality
where access itself could be a function of value. Furthermore, a change in access may lead
to a change in the information that individuals have about an alternative, thus shifting
beliefs. In this paper, access-based beliefs are examined in a lab setting where learning
channels can be controlled for to isolate the mechanisms of interest.
In a lab experiment, I elicit beliefs of an ambiguous lottery as the objective chance
to obtain it varies. I find that lowering access to the subjective lottery, reduces implied
beliefs of its value, consistent with the colloquial notion of sour grapes. I further find that
this effect is concentrated amongst individuals with high initial beliefs of the lottery. This
is consistent with the intuition that individuals who desire an alternative are most likely
to engage in sour grapes.
To provide a theoretical explanation of the effect, I adapt an optimal beliefs model
from the motivated beliefs literature in which individuals’ tradeoff anticipatory utility with
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gain-loss utility when choosing beliefs of the subjective (ambiguous) lottery. I demonstrate
that beliefs increase when the likelihood of obtaining the subjective lottery goes up under
most reasonable parameter assumptions. I rule out popular current and past models in
ambiguity and reference dependence as unable to explain access-based beliefs. In this
regard, the paper can be viewed as one of the first direct tests between motivated beliefs
and theories of decision-making under ambiguity.
An interesting implication of the study is that it provides an alternative explanation
of the endowment effect. The endowment effect is the finding that initial ownership of
a good (or an expectation to own it) increases its valuation. If we think of the initial
endowment as providing people with access, then there is clearly a conceptual connection
between access-based beliefs and the endowment effect. However, in the paper we show
that the prominent model of decision-making used to explain the endowment effect, namely
reference dependence, does not make the prediction of an endowment effect when the
outcome is a subjective lottery. By contrast, motivated belief models are capable of
providing an explanation for both the standard endowment effect and the findings in
this paper. Nonetheless, access-based beliefs and reference dependence are two different
accounts of the endowment effect, and a promising area of future work might be to develop
further tests distinguishing the two theories.
In the next chapter we provide evidence for access-based beliefs in real-world settings
and discuss some suggestive evidence of their prevalence in the domains of education and
health.
Chapter 1 and 2 in full are being combined and prepared for submission for
publication of the material. The dissertation author, Vinayak Alladi was the primary
investigator and author of this material.
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1.7 Appendix
Please contact the author for any additional information
1.7.1 Optimal Beliefs Without Reference Dependence
In this section, I show that experiment 1 can be modeled using Brunnermeier
and Parker’s (2005) optimal beliefs framework and that the sour grapes prediction can
be derived. I adapt BP (originally designed for objective uncertainty) to our setting
of ambiguity in the following sense. Just as a BP-agent can hold objective beliefs and
subjective beliefs, I imagine that an individual facing ambiguity can hold two sets of
subjective beliefs; one being what the individual truly believes, and the second being what
the individual deceives himself into believing in order to feel happier. I call the first set
the “rational subjective beliefs” and the second set the “optimal subjective beliefs” and
the BP model constrains the individual to act on the second set.
First, I write down the optimal beliefs utility function in its general form: P is a
set of rational subjective beliefs, q is a set of optimal subjective beliefs,γ is the weight on
consumption utility , (1−γ) is the weight on anticipatory utility, Q is the action taken by
the individual, and U is a well-behaved utility function. (Subjective) Expected Utility is
then:
U (q,P,Q) = γUt+1(P,Q) + (1−γ)Eq[U(Q(q))]−{EP [U(Q(P ))]−EP [U(Q(q))]} (1.1)
The first term is the entire future consumption utility, the second term is the
anticipated utility experienced today, and the third term is the economic costs of optimal
beliefs, that is, the difference in expected utility when the agent holds rational subjective
beliefs and acts accordingly minus the expected utility when the agent holds rational
subjective beliefs and acts according to the optimally chosen subjective beliefs.
The agent’s decision-problem is to solve for the optimal set of subjective beliefs
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using a two-stage backwards induction process: (1) At the end, the agent takes an optimal
action, given the optimally chosen beliefs from stage 1. (2) Using backward induction, the
agent maximizes utility by calculating the optimal set of subjective beliefs to choose given
he knows what actions will be taken for any set of chosen beliefs.
Thus, I begin at the final step where agents choose their optimal action, in this
case, their report on the multiple price list Q given the optimally chosen beliefs q. The
optimal report is the point at which the ambiguous and objective lottery are indifferent.
Note I use q for optimally chosen subjective beliefs to distinguish from p which represented
any general beliefs of the urn, whether chosen optimally or not.
u(L) + q · [u(H)−u(L)] = u(L) +Q · [u(H)−u(L)] (1.2)
q =Q (1.3)
Moving to the second stage, I re-write equation (1) above explicitly for experiment
1 and derive the optimal beliefs q. Without loss of generality, I allow the probabilities
of the risky urn to vary continuously, even though in the actual MPL they are discrete.
Furthermore, I make one small change to notation: In figure 1, I used α, β and (1−α−β)
as the probability that either the urn, the outside option, or the elicitation will payout
respectively. For notational convenience, here I use R to represent the chance that either
the urn or the outside option pays out, and (1−R) as the chance that the payout is
based on the elicitation. Without loss of generality, I assume linear utility for notational
convenience and ∆, to represent the difference in payoffs H−L. Finally, I let consumption
utility, γUt+1(P,α,Q) = C, since it does not depend on q at all and ultimately drops out
of the solution.
U (q;P,α,Q) = C+ (1−γ){L+ ∆[R+ (1−R)(
∫ Q∗
0
qdv+
∫ 1
Q∗
vdv)]}+{L+ ∆[R+(1−R)(
∫ Q∗
0
P dv+
∫ 1
Q∗
vdv)]} (1.4)
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The next step is to use backward induction and plug in the solution of the second
stage in terms of p into the first stage, yielding:
U (q;P,α,Q) = C+ (1−γ){L+ ∆[R+ (1−R)(
∫ q
0
qdv+
∫ 1
q
vdv)]}+{L+ ∆[R+(1−R)(
∫ q
0
P dv+
∫ 1
q
vdv)]} (1.5)
evaluating the integrals I get :
U (q;P,α,Q) = γUt+1(P,α,Q) +(1−γ)(L+ ∆[R+ (1−R)(q2 + (1− q
2)
2
)] +L+ ∆[R+(1−R)(qP + (1− q
2)
2
)] (1.6)
The derivative of the utility function above with respect to q:
U ′ (q;P,α,Q) = (1−γ)∆(Rα+ (1−R)(2q− q)) +∆(1−R)(P − q) = 0 =⇒ q∗ = P
γ
+ (1−γ)Rα
γ(1−R) (1.7)
taking the derivative of q∗ with respect to α I get our prediction of sour grapes :
dq∗
dα
= (1−γ)R
γ(1−R) (1.8)
The derivative will always be positive, thus demonstrating that an increase in access
to the ambiguous urn, i.e. an increase in α, leads to an unambiguous increase in beliefs
about the urn. The expression for the derivative is intuitive. If γ = 1, meaning that there
is no weight on anticipatory utility, then q = P . Conversely, as γ approaches zero, the
weight on anticipatory utility increases, and the higher is q relative to P . Furthermore,
when R, the chance that the participant’s payoffs are not determined by the incentivized
task, increases, the incentive to inflate beliefs also increases. As constructed, q is always
greater than or equal to P , i.e. optimal subjective beliefs are always greater than or equal
to rational subjective beliefs, and adapting the model further to allow for a more explicitly
for sour grapes is work in progress.
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1.7.2 Non-SEU Models of Ambiguity
Gilboa-Schmeidler Max-Min
The most popular non-SEU model is the Gilboa-Schmeidler Max-Min Expected
Utility (MEU) in which the probability measure is no longer unique, and individuals
evaluate the lottery by entertaining the most pessimistic distribution from a set of possible
distributions over the outcomes. Once again using notation from Andreoni, T. Schmidt,
and Sprenger, 2015, where a is the subjective act, I write the MEU of the compound
lottery presented in figure 1:
UMEU (αa+ (1−α)L) = min
p∈P
[α(p ·u(H) + (1−p) ·u(L)) + (1−α)u(L)] (1.9)
While the model can explain the Ellsberg paradox it cannot generate the type
of violation predicted by sour grapes. This is because the model assumes a form of the
independence axiom known as certainty independence which states that when mixing
with an objective lottery, individuals treat the subjective part equally. Specifically, under
MEU, a single belief governs the subjective lottery for any mixture with an objective one
while for sour grapes, the beliefs over the subjective lottery change for different objective
mixtures.
Kilbanoff, Marinacci, Mukerji Smooth-Ambiguity
Another prominent model in the literature, Klibanoff et al. (2005, KMM for
short), can predict sour grapes provided a change to one of its core assumptions is made.
Unlike Gilboa-Schmeidler Max-Min, KMM does predict an interaction between changes in
probability mixtures and valuations of the subjective lottery but the interaction goes in
the opposite direction of sour grapes.
The KMM model features a decision maker who has a proper probability distribution
over states but does not treat the expected utilities obtained in each state equally. The
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utility functional is of the form:
UKMM (f) =
∫
S
p(s)φ(u(a(s)))ds (1.10)
where u(a(s)) is the expected utility in state s and these expected utilities are then
aggregated over states by the utility aggregation function φ. When mixing a subjective
and objective lottery, the impact of a change in the probability mixture depends upon
the shape of the φ function. If the φ function is concave, then increasing α will decrease
the overall utility of the subjective part of the lottery, consistent with ambiguity aversion.
However, if the φ function is convex, then increasing α will increase the overall utility
of the subjective part of the lottery, consistent with ambiguity-seeking behavior. Thus,
KMM can explain sour grapes, but it would require changing an assumption that makes it
inconsistent with past results.
1.7.3 Reference Points
Reference Dependence Preliminaries
To fix ideas, Let x be a consumption outcome drawn according to measure F,
and r be the reference point. Then, the expected utility of a gamble is outcome is:
U(F |r) = ∫ u(x|r)dF (x) where u(x|r) =m(x)+µ(m(x)−r). The function m(·) represents
consumption utility and µ(·) represents gain-loss utility relative to the referent, r.
For simplicity I assume that for small-stakes decisions, consumption utility, m(·),
can plausibly be taken as approximately linear, and a piecewise-linear gain-loss utility
function is adopted as follows:
µ(y) =

λH ·y y ≥ 0
λL ·y y < 0
,
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where λL > λH represents the degree of loss aversion. For a general reference
dependence model, I can write the expected utility of our experiment as:
U(F |r) = pHH+ (1−pH)L+pHλH(H− r) + (1−pH)λL(L− r) (1.11)
Fixed Reference Point
Proposition 1.1. Under reference-dependent preferences with linear gain-loss utility and
a referent fixed at a value r, conditional on [(H−L)+λH · (H−r)+λL · (r−L)]> 0, which
is true under reasonable parameter assumptions, the optimal report of the agent is p∗ = p,
her true valuation of the ambiguous lottery. In addition, the optimal report does not depend
on the probability of access to the urn, α.
The intuition for the result, and of the later results for reference dependence,
is essentially the same. Our choice variable q enters our objective function solely via
pH , the probability of a high outcome. Therefore, as in the case for a rational agent
without reference dependence, our problem reduces to finding the q that maximizes pH and
checking whether this is a maximum of the function. With reference dependence, I need
to check second order conditions to ensure that the incentives to increase consumption
utility outweigh those to mitigate the loss part of gain-loss utility. In the case that our
objective function is linear in pH , I can verify this by checking the sign of the coefficient
that multiplies pH . Under all reasonable parameter assumptions, the sign of the coefficient
is positive so that the optimal choice is to maximize pH by setting q = p.
The second part of the proposition is finding the impact of access to the ambiguous
lottery, α, on our optimal choice. Since α does not enter pH it has no marginal impact on
the optimal choice so I can rule out any effect. A change in α could potentially change the
function’s maximum to a minimum, but this would lead to a discontinuous jump of the
optimal choice to its boundaries for small changes in α which I do not observe in the data.
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Proof. The optimal report is the report that maximizes equation 7 above. I can re-write
the equation as:
U(F |r) = pH · (H−L) +L+pH ·λH · (H− r) + (1−pH) ·λL(L− r) (1.12)
U(F |r) = pH · [(H−L) +λH · (H− r) +λL · (r−L)] +L+λL(L− r) (1.13)
As long as:
[(H−L) +λH · (H− r) +λL · (r−L)]> 0 (1.14)
then equation 9 be maximized by maximizing pH , the only part of the equation
where q enters. As was shown in proposition 1, the optimal choice, q∗ = p and does not
vary with the probability of getting the ambiguous lottery, α.
Under most reasonable parameter assumptions the above condition will hold. By
assumption , H > L , so the first term is greater than zero. As long as the following
condition on the reference point holds, L≤ r ≤H this also guarantees that the remaining
terms in brackets are greater than or equal to zero. It would be unreasonable to have a
reference point that is lower than the lowest outcome in the gamble , so I do not consider
that case. However, even if this were true, the resulting function would have a maximum
either at p∗ = 0 or p∗ = 1 regardless of α.
Expectations-Based Reference Points
Another possibility for the reference point is based on what you expect to get in the
lottery. There are two formulations of expectations-based reference points that I consider:
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Case 1: Reference Point = Expected Utility of the Lottery
This notion of a reference point has been explored in models of disappointment aversion
(Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1986). Its impact in our model is to introduce an
additional source of disutility from maximizing the probability of a high outcome since it
mechanically increases the reference point from which gains and losses are calculated. In
other words, the reference point becomes endogenous, or choice-acclimating as expectations
respond to our choices. This source of disutility was not previously seen under a fixed r.
Consider the same objective function as equation 9, except that the reference point,
r, is now defined as the expected utility of the lottery pHH+ (1−pH)L. Let ∆ =H−L ,
then the objective function is:
U(F |r) = pH∆ +L+pHλH(H− (pH∆ +L)) + (1−pH)λL(L− (pH∆ +L)) (1.15)
Proposition 1.2. Under reference-dependent preferences with linear gain-loss utility,
where the referent is the expected value of the lottery, the optimal report of the agent is
p∗ = p, her true valuation of the ambiguous lottery, conditional on ∆λL > (∆ +HλH +
2rαp∆(λL−λH)), which is true under reasonable parameter assumptions. In addition, the
optimal report does not depend on the probability of access to the urn, α.
Proof. beginning with equation 11 above, I assume, without loss of generality, that L = 0.
This yields:
U(F |r) = pH∆ +pHλH(H−pH∆)− (1−pH)λLpH∆ (1.16)
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collecting the pH terms and the p2H terms separately I get:
U(F |r) = pH(∆ +λHH−λL∆) +p2H∆(λL−λH) (1.17)
I can write equation 13 in terms of q by substituting for pH as follows:
U(F |r) = (Rαp+ (1−R)[qp+ 1− q
2
2 ])(∆ +λHH−λL∆) +
(Rαp+ (1−R)[qp+ 1− q
2
2 ])
2∆(λL−λH) (1.18)
I expand the equation by collecting all terms that multiply with (1−R)[qp+ 1−q22 ]),
and all terms that multiply with (1−R)[qp+ 1−q22 ])2, separately. The remaining additive
terms that do not include q are represented as K.
U(F |r) =K+ [qp+ 1− q
2
2 ])(∆ +HλH −∆λL+ 2rαp∆(λL−λH)) +
((1−R)[qp+ 1− q
2
2 ])
2∆(λL−λH) (1.19)
It is important for us to sign the term in brackets that multiplies the linear q
term. The only term in this expression which is negative is ∆λL. So, unless ∆λL >
(∆ +HλH + 2rαp∆(λL−λH)) ,which is not the case in our experiment and will generally
not be true for reasonable estimates of λL/λH ≤ 2 , the typically observed ratio in lab
experiments that measure loss aversion, the sum of the terms will be positive. Thus,
assuming a positive value for this expression, the above equation can be maximized by
setting q∗ = p as shown form the first order condition below:
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dU(F |r)
dq
= (1−R)(p− q)(∆ +HλH −∆λL+ 2rαp∆(λL−λH)) +
(1−R)[qp+ 1− q
2
2 ])
2(p− q)∆(λL−λH) = 0 (1.20)
When q∗ = p the first order condition is zero. This is a local maximum as the
second order condition dU(F |r)dq < 0 under all reasonable assumptions of the parameter
values.
Furthermore, the optimal report, q∗, does not depend on α. Unlike in the case
of the fixed reference point, α does enter multiplicatively in our first order condition.
However, changing α does not impact the local maximum of the function at q∗ = p as
shown in the first order condition above.
There is now a tradeoff between increasing pH to maximize consumption utility
and reducing pH to lower the reference point, r. The optimal report thus depends on
which of the two channels is stronger. Under the assumption of linear gain-loss utility,
with reasonable parameter assumptions, the incentives to increase pH are stronger so the
optimal report is q∗ = p. Additionally, the optimal report continues to be independent of
access to the subjective lottery since changes in the parameter α have no impact on the
value of q that maximizes pH .
Case 2: Koszegi-Rabin Reference Dependence
Under KR preferences , the reference point is the entire distribution of the lottery.
This specification comes from the Koszegi-Rabin model of reference dependence (2006)
(KR) which provides a well-defined structure to the formation of a reference point. KR
reference dependence assumes that ” a person reference point is her probabilistic beliefs
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about the relevant consumption outcome held between the time she first focused on the
decision determining the outcome and shortly before consumption occurs.” (1141).
Consider again x to be a consumption outcome drawn according to measure F. Let
r represent the referent drawn according to measure G. Then the KR utility formulation is:
U(F |G) = ∫∫ u(x|r)dG(r)dF (x) with u(x|r) =m(x) +µ(m(x)−m(r)). The function m(·)
represents consumption utility and µ(·) represents gain-loss utility relative to the referent,
r. I assume the linear gain-loss utility described in the previous section.
The referent, in this case, is an endowment of an objective-subjective lottery. Given
this lottery, an individual makes a series of choices on an MPL. Since these choices impact
the final lottery she will face, the individual’s referent lottery depends on her choices in
the elicitation.
KR define an equilibrium concept called personal equilibrium (PE) in which an
individual’s plan is optimal given her expectations, her expectations are rational given her
plans, and that the plans are credible in that the individual has no incentive to deviate
from her plan when choices are made. Equilibrium at the choice level may be too fine a
degree of granularity for choice experiments in which individuals make a series of decisions
(as argued in Sprenger (2015)). In our experiment, the series of choices (displayed in the
uncertainty equivalent task in Figure 1.2) yields a plan of the following form: choose the
subjective lottery over the risky prospect up to the point q∗ (the individual’s uncertainty
equivalent), and choose the risky prospect from this point on.
For this plan to be a PE it must be that the participant is indifferent between
the subjective lottery and the risky prospect at the value of q∗, meaning that there is no
incentive to deviate. In other words, the individual will choose a q∗ that maximizes her
KR utility. 51
Under these preliminaries, the KR expected utility can be written down as follows:
51In the language of KR, the referent lottery can be described more precisely as choices on the elicitation
such that her choices maximize her KR utility given those expectations.
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U(G|G) = pH ·pH ·u(H|H) + (1−pH) · (1−pH) ·u(L|L) +pH · (1−pH) ·u(H|L)
+(1−pH) ·pH ·u(L|H) (1.21)
The first term refers to the chance of expecting H as the referent and obtaining H as
the consumption outcome. The second term is similar for L. The third term refers to the
chance of expecting H as the referent and obtaining L as the consumption outcome.The
fourth term refers to the chance of expecting L as the referent and obtaining H as the
consumption outcome. With H > L, the KR model predicts loss aversion to be present in
the fourth term. 52
Analyzing the model yields proposition 1 below. Under reasonable parameter
assumptions on the degree of loss aversion, the optimal choice is q∗ = p, and because α
does not enter the expression for pH , it has no marginal impact on the optimal choice that
maximizes pH . Thus, KR preferences cannot explain the effect. I prove this below.
Proposition 1.3. Under Kosezgi-Rabin reference-dependent preferences with linear gain-
loss utility, where the referent is stochastic, the optimal report of the agent is her true
valuation of the ambiguous lottery, , p∗ = p, if the condition (∆ + (1− 2Rαp)((λH −
λLH)∆) > 0 is met, which holds under reasonable parameter assumptions. In addition,
the optimal report does not depend on the probability of access to the urn, α.
Proof. As before, without loss of generality, I assume linear utility and re-write equation
52With KR preferences, note that the referent is impacted differently by the optimal q than under
models of disappointment aversion, where the referent is the expected utility of the gamble. Specifically,
each possible outcome is compared to every other possible outcome when calculating gains and losses so
that rather than (L− r) and (H− r), the gain-loss terms are (L−H) and (H−L). This means that the
choice variable, q, does not enter into the value of the gain or loss, but only in its probability.
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17 as:
U(G|G) = pH ·H+ (1−pH) ·L+pH(1−pH)[λH(H−L) +λL(L−H)] (1.22)
let ∆ =H−L:
U(G|G) = L+pH∆ +pH(1−pH)[∆(λH −λL)] (1.23)
Substituting for pH :
U(G|G) = L+ (Rαp+ (1−R)[qp+ 1− q
2
2 ]) ·∆ +
(Rαp+ (1−R)[qp+ 1− q
2
2 ]) · (1− (Rαp+ (1−R)[qp+
1− q2
2 ]))
·[λH(H−L) +λL(L−H)] (1.24)
As I do in proposition 3, I expand and collect terms that multiply with (1−
R)[qp+ 1−q
2
2 ]), and all terms that multiply with (1−R)[qp+ 1−q
2
2 ])
2, separately. The
remaining additive terms that do not include q are represented as K.
U(G|G) =K+ ((1−R)[qp+ 1− q
2
2 ])(∆ + (1−2Rαp)((λH −λL)∆)−
((1−R)[qp+ 1− q
2
2 ])
2∆(λL−λH) (1.25)
The first order condition becomes:
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dU(G|G)
dq
= (1−R)(p− q)(∆ + (1−2Rαp)((λH −λLH)∆)−
(1−R)[qp+ 1− q
2
2 ])
2(p− q)∆(λH −λL) = 0 (1.26)
Once again, for all reasonable values of the parameters , the expression (∆ + (1−
2Rαp)((λH −λLH)∆) > 0, unless λL/λH is much greater than 2. The squared part of
the function is multiplied by a coefficient that is always negative, ∆(λH −λL). However,
because this part of the function is subtracted, it increases the function overall. This
means that the first order condition is zero when q∗ = p.This is a local maximum as the
second order condition dU(F |r)dq < 0 under all reasonable assumptions of the parameter
values.
Furthermore, the optimal report, q∗, does not depend on α. Unlike in the case
of the fixed reference point, α does enter mutliplicatively in our first order condition.
However, changing α does not impact the maximum of the function q∗ = p as shown by
the first order condition above.
1.7.4 Differences in Payouts Between US and India
The payouts in India were calibrated so that the amounts would be equivalent, in
purchasing power parity terms, to 30 and 10 US dollars respectively. Using a measure of
PPP from the World Bank and from inputs of the economics faculty at Christ University,
I chose the high payout amount to be 500 Rupees, which is one of the denominations
of Indian currency. The low amount was chosen to be 150 Rupees so that the ratio of
high to low approximately equaled $30 to $10 to make it comparable with sessions in the
US. Although both the high and low payouts are slightly lower in India (after adjusting
for PPP and converting to US dollars) I feel, if anything, the excitement around getting
money for participation was higher in India where students had not been exposed to this
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kind of incentivized participation before.
1.7.5 Choice to Belief Mapping in Version 3
In figure 1.7 below I show how the mapping varies for a standard power utility
function with constant relative risk aversion, u(x) = xγ at three different values of γ =
(0.3,0.6,1)
Figure 1.7. Choice to Belief Mapping at Different Levels of Risk Aversion
As shown above, as risk aversion decreases from 0.3 to 1, the slopes of the choice-
to-belief functions also decrease. Thus, in order to be conservative with our estimates
of the treatment effect, I choose risk neutrality as a bench mark for converting choices
into beliefs and assume that u(x) = x. This will give us a lower bound on the size of the
treatment effect relative to a mapping that assumes risk aversion.
Figure 1.7 also shows that the level of beliefs is always higher for lower levels of
assumed risk aversion in the domain of our elicitation choice. This may impact comparison
of the level of beliefs across different versions. I discuss this in the results section.
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With our assumption that u(x) = x, the mapping from choices to beliefs using the
amounts paid out in India becomes:
p= q 500500−150 −
150
500−150
This means for every higher row at which a participant switched from preferring
JAR A to JAR B, the change in beliefs is %7.14, while in versions 1 and 2, the same
change in row will be %5 as shown previously.
It was possible for implied beliefs to be greater than 1 due to the belief intervals
being %5, or due to the mapping function, in the case of version 3. So ,in these instances,
beliefs were capped at 1. Similarly, beliefs could have been negative in version 3 due to
the mapping function so these beliefs were capped at 0.
1.7.6 Implementing Payment
A random incentive mechanism was employed to pay subjects - a method commonly
used in the experimental literature and in experiments with ambiguity (Ahn, Choi, Gale,
and Kariv, 2007; Halevy, 2007). In these mechanisms, one of the subjects decisions is
chosen at random as the ”decision-that-counts” and the corresponding lotteries are played
out. In our case, subjects are informed that if the envelope they open says “task”, then
1 of the 21 decisions they made will be chosen randomly; the corresponding subjective
or objective prospect, depending on which was chosen, will be constructed; and a ball
will be drawn from the jar for payout. One of the issues with this mechanism is incentive
compatibility, i.e., will the choices elicited through a random incentive mechanism coincide
with the choices in a single choice problem?
The answer depends on one main concern first raised by Raiffa (1961) - that subjects
use the random incentive mechanism to perfectly hedge against ambiguity. In the classic
Ellsberg 2-color problem, subjects make a pair of choices between a subjective urn with red
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and black balls and a risky urn with 50% red and 50% black balls. The first choice is a bet
on red and the second choice is a bet on black. If the participant chooses the ambiguous
urn in both cases, then the random payment mechanism would give a bet on one color or a
bet on the other color with equal probability. Regardless of the color of the drawn marble
the participant is holding an objective 50-50 gamble, hedging the ambiguity completely
and potentially misreporting his preferences.53 One advantage of our experiment is that
subjects face only one subjective lottery - a bet on the color of their choice. Thus, it is
theoretically impossible for subjects in our experiment to hedge against ambiguity.
A second concern is that if subjects reduce compound lotteries, a random payment
mechanism is incentive compatible only if subjects are expected utility maximizers (and
thus follow the independence axiom). However, experimental results documenting the
reduction of compound lotteries are rare and Halevy (2007) finds that those who do perform
reduction tend to satisfy independence. Thus, subjects who respect reduction seem to be
rare, and seem to be exactly those for whom independence is a reasonable assumption.
Furthermore, the optimal beliefs model that I advocate to explain access-based beliefs does
follow subjective expected utility in the second-stage when subjects actually make their
choices, and would not suffer the concern about non-expected utility preferences. The
other non-SEU ambiguity models I explore, including max-min SEU and KMM smooth
ambiguity, do not make the predictions of access-based beliefs even when considering a
single choice over lotteries, so worrying about the incentive compatibility under those
models is second order.
53To elaborate, consider an ambiguity averse participant whose underlying preferences are to bet on
the two known rather than on the two ambiguous events. However, if he views the two choices as a single
decision problem, he may conclude that by choosing bets on the two unknown events he will win with a
probability of 0.5, independently of the event that will materialize which is identical to the probability
of winning by choosing the two risky bets. Therefore, he is indifferent between truthfully reporting his
preferences, and reporting the opposite preferences.
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1.7.7 Multiple Switchers
Summary
As mentioned, I deal with differential rates of multiple switching (8.3 p.p. lower
multiple-switching in the low access group driven by the Indian portion of the study) in
three ways:
(1) I conduct identical analysis as in table for just the US portion of the data,
which makes up 75% of the sample. I present these results in appendix 1.7.9 . Overall ,
I find similar magnitudes as in the full sample with slightly less precision. For the full
distribution of beliefs, the treatment effect has a point estimate of -1.4 but is insignificant
(p-value of .415). However, when focusing on the individuals with coherent beliefs, that
is, beliefs larger than 50%, I find treatment effects in the same range as I did for the full
sample that are also significant. Controlling for observables, the impact on low access is
between -2.3 p.p. and -3.0 p.p. depending on specification with significance at the 10%
level.
(2) I present the Lee-bounds for the main treatment effects in the last three rows
of table 1.5 in the results section. As can be expected for treatment effects of the size we
find, the effect strengthens significantly for trimming at the lower bound, but does not
survive trimming at the lower bound.
(3) I perform choice-level analysis of the treatment effects which includes the
multiple switchers in two ways: (1) all types of multiple switchers regardless of how
random the pattern of switching, this represents about 30% of the data (2) those who
display a systematic pattern of switching54, which is about 1/3 of the multiple switchers,
representing about 10% of the data. Overall, I find that the treatment effects are more
robust to including multiple switchers who display a systematic pattern of switching. Being
54For example, some subjects displayed a pattern of only switching one extra time or switch back and
forth. Others switched several times in the middle of the MPL when the two lotteries were of more equal
value, but not at the ends.
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in the low access treatment leads individuals to be less likely to choose the subjective
lottery by about 2 p.p with p-values ranging from .06 to .167 depending on specification.
However, when I include all types of multiple switchers the treatment effect still has a
small negative point estimate -.009, but is not significant (p-value of .354). I present
choice-level results with a more detailed discussion in online appendix - section 4.
Choice Probabilities
Our analysis so far is conducted with one observation per individual marking their
switch point on the MPL. The primary drawback is that this leaves out multiple-switchers,
for whom we cannot infer a belief. Analysis at the choice-level allows us to include multiple
switchers and provides some gains in statistical power as each subjects make 21 decisions
in our experiment.
To better understand data at the choice level, we first examine choice probabilities
graphically. Figure 1.8 below depicts the probability of choosing the ambiguous prospect
for each row of the elicitation by treatment condition for the sample of single switchers
and multiple switchers , separately.
Panel (A) is for the sample of single-point switchers and therefore should mirror
what I learned from the analysis of distributional treatment effects which is that in versions
1 and 2 of the experiment (top row, left graph) I see marginal positive effects of high
access on switch points at the higher end of the MPL (in this case rows 12 to 14) and for
version 3 , I see more pronounced effects of high access at a broader range of the MPL
(rows 9 to 16).
Panel (B) of figure 1.8 shows the graphs for the sample of multiple switchers only.
Multiple switchers in the high access group do not seem to exhibit a greater likelihood
of choosing JAR A compared to low, which I had no prior on since I do not have a
theory on multiple-switching. Secondly, the graphs have a downward slope for both
treatment conditions. In other words, the probability of choosing JAR A decreases as
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Figure 1.8. Choice Probabilities By Row for All participants
53
the row number increases among the multiple switchers, suggesting that participants
are responding to incentives. Furthermore, responses on the post-study questionnaires
about how individuals made choices on the task suggest that some types of multiple
switching were more systematically thought out than others so that some patterns of
multiple switching are not random. In the next section, I categorize types of multiple
switchers who were more systematic in their choices and estimate treatment effects for the
sample of single-switchers plus these ”systematic” multiple-switchers.
Systematically Dealing With Multiple Switchers
Multiple switchers (participants who fail to indicate a unique switch point in the
elicitation) represented about 50% of the data collected in India. However, the downward
slopes of the choice probabilities in figure 1.8, panel B reflects that some portion of multiple
switchers did respond to the incentives of the elicitation and are not choosing between
JAR A and JAR B randomly. I classify two kinds of these multiple switchers that were
prominent in the data, the ”get-lucky” switchers, who only switched one other time in the
MPL, and the ”trembling-hand” switchers, who prefer JAR A initially (for the first at
least 5 rows) and JAR B later on (for at least the last 5) , and are undecided in-between.
I calculate treatment effects at the choice-level including these multiple switchers
into our sample and estimating the following regression:
Choiceij = β0 +β1LowAccess+
t∑
k=1
βkxi+ ij (1.27)
In total, 28 individuals exhibited the ”get-lucky switch” while 19 individuals
exhibited ”trembling hands”. These numbers account for 6% and 4% of the data respectively.
I present results of this analysis in table 1.6. Overall, it seems that including multiple
switchers improves our confidence of the treatment effects in versions 1 and 2 but leads to
slightly weaker estimates in version 3 where the number of added observations is low (only
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6 individuals in version 3 fall under the category of ”get-lucky” switchers and 6 individuals
fall under the category of trembling hands.).
Overall it seems that the analysis of treatment effects at the choice level leads to
stronger estimates in the case of version 1 and 2 when I add systematic multiple switchers,
but weaker estimates in version 3 where the number of added observations is low (only 6
individuals in version 3 fall under the category of ”get-lucky” switchers and 6 individuals
fall under the category of trembling hands.). I present detailed analysis in table 1.6 below.
Get-lucky Switchers
Examination of the post-study questionnaires shows that some multiple switchers
were trying to ”get-lucky” by switching at some random point of the elicitation in addition to
their indifference point. I categorize these multiple switchers as the ”Get-lucky Switchers”,
meaning that besides their indifference point, they made one more random switch, but
importantly, switched back again.55
Trembling-hands Switchers
Another pattern found was individuals who exhibited what can be termed ”trembling
hands”. These individuals chose JAR A for the first ”n” number of rows, and then seemed
to switch between JAR A and JAR B for a a few rows thereafter before finally shifting
to JAR B for the remaining ”m” rows. Since there is no exact way to decide how many
middle rows is appropraite to distinguish random-switching from trembling hands, I define
trembling hands as individuals who chose JAR A for the first ”n” rows, and JAR B for
the last ”m” rows and could have any switching pattern in the middle where ”n” and ”m”
55To be more precise, the number of switches for these individuals is three since the ”get-lucky” switch
consists of them switching from one JAR to the other, but then immediately switching back after that
row. This is in addition to a regular switch point. One might ask, what about individuals who switch
twice. Those who switched twice were those who began preferring JAR A, than switched to preferring
JAR B at some point, and then switched back to JAR A from then on. Or, the opposite could have
occurred where individuals began preferring JAR B, than switched to preferring JAR A at some point,
and then switched back to JAR B from then on. Either way, there is a portion of their choices that are
more irrational than those who switched 3 times
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are at least 5 (there are a total of 21 rows). I test the sensitivity of this definition over a
range of possible middle row values.
In total, 28 individuals exhibited the ”get-lucky switch” while 19 individuals
exhibited ”trembling hands”. These numbers account for 6% and 4% of the data respectively.
I show specifically how many fall into each version and how many for each threshold of
trembling hands in our regression tables below.
Table 1.6 presents the findings of this analysis for version 1 and 2 where I run the
following linear probability model:
Choiceij = β0 +β1LowAccess+
t∑
k=1
βkxi+ ij (1.28)
Where Choice′ is a ”1” or ”0” depending on whether individual ’i’ chose JAR A
in row ’j’. ′Lowaccess′ is a binary indicator for the treatment and the ′x′is′ are a set
of demographic questions asked during the post-study questionnaire. Our main test of
the theory is whether or not β1 is less than 0. I choose a linear probability model as
the coefficients are easier to interpret and I am mostly interested in the differences in
probability of choosing JAR A by treatment. Indeed, none of our results have boundary
concerns.
Column 1 of table 5 shows the results of estimation equation 19 on individuals in
versions 1 and 2 with a unique switch-point. I find that the likelihood of choosing JAR A
is 1% lower (p-value of .413) in low access groups from a baseline of .505. As predicted,
adding all types of multiple switchers to the sample reduces the difference in likelihood to
.8%.
In column 3, I restrict our analysis to single-point switchers and the ”get-lucky”
switchers who switched back and forth between JAR A and JAR B at one other point.
Running equation 19 on this sample of individuals increases our point estimate of the
treatment effect to 1.9% and the p-value to .123. Although still insignificant, this is a
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large change in both the treatment effect and our confidence of it.
.
Table 1.6. Treatment Effects With Multiple Switchers for Versions 1 and 2
Dependent Variable: Probability of Choosing JAR A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Low Access -0.010 -0.008 -0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.018 -0.018
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)* (0.012) (0.012)
Constant 0.505 0.506 0.501 0.509 0.508 0.526 0.526
(0.021) (0.029) (0.047) (0.044) (0.044) (0.020) (0.021)
Observations 4762 6702 5223 5495 5433 5349 5265
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Low Access = 0 0.413 0.436 0.123 0.100 0.086 0.120 0.128
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Single Switch Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Get lucky Switch N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Trembling Hand N Y N 5 6 7 8
Other Multiple Switchers N Y N N N N N
Number of extra individuals 22 13 10 6 2
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01 ***.
In columns 4 to 7, I add to this sample the individuals who exhibited trembling
hands. The row of the table labeled ”Trembling Hand” indicates the number of rows at
the beginning (”n”) and end of the elicitation (”m”) for which the individual would have
had to choose JAR A and JAR B respectively to be considered in this regression. Thus,
for column 4, ”n” and ”m” are both 5. For column 5, ”n” and ”m” are both 6 and so on
till column 7 where ”n” and ”m” are both 8.
In column 4 I look at the case where I add trembling hand individuals and n =
5. The treatment effect remains at 1.9% as was the case in column 3, and the p-value
comes is 0.1. This is the range of treatment effects I see in columns 5 to 8 as well, with
p-values ranging from .086 to .128. It seems that most of the impact comes from ”get-lucky”
switchers but that there are some marginal gains in confidence of these estimates by adding
”trembling hands” switchers as well.
I conduct the same analysis for version 3 and show results in appendix H (table
H.1). The first column shows what I learn from the implied beliefs analysis in table 2. In
version 3, individuals in the low access group are 6% less likely (p-value of .058) to choose
JAR A from a baseline of 73.9%. Adding multiple switchers in column 2 almost eliminates
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this entire effect as the point estimate drops to .4% (p-value of .840). In column 3, I add
the ”get-lucky” switchers and the point-estimate increases to -3.6% (p-value of .286). In
columns 4 to 6 , I add the trembling hand switchers who picked JAR A for the first 10
(9, 8) rows and JAR B for the last 4 (3, 2) rows. The point estimates on the treatment
effects are almost identical while the p-values also range from .286 to .249.
1.7.8 Structural Analysis of Treatment Effects
Moving from choice probabilities to the actual structural estimation, I jointly
estimate beliefs and a noise parameter using a probabilistic choice function. Given the
subjective expected utility of the subjective lottery, U(A), and the expected utility of the
risky prospect, U(B), the probability that an individual chooses the subjective lottery can
be expressed as:
Pr(ChoiceA) = F (U(A)−U(B)
ν
), (1.29)
where U(X) =∑i p(xi)u(xi) and u(xi) = xα. The parameter ν measures stochastic
decision error and F is a log normal or logistic CDF transformation that yields the
probability of choosing JAR A. The analysis assumes that all individuals within a treatment
condition have the same preference parameters and that all heterogeneity comes from
decision error. Notice, as ν tends to zero, the function tends to 1. Similarly as ν tends to
infinity, the function tends to 0. In between, the probabilities moves from 0 and 1, and ν
smooths the choice probability function.
Table 1.7 below shows the results of the structural estimation.We assume a level of
risk aversion of α = 0.7, the average estimated level of risk aversion in Holt and Laury
(2002), and use maximum likelihood techniques to estimate beliefs and a noise parameter.
Overall, I find similar results to our reduced-form analysis. Our estimates of belief levels
are very similar for versions 1 and 2, where risk aversion is unidentified , and slightly lower
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for version 3.
In columns 1 to 3 I estimate beliefs separately by treatment condition, and a noise
parameter common to both treatments, on the sample of participants who were unique
switchers. I find little evidence of the sour grapes effect for versions 1 and 2, a difference
in beliefs between high and low access groups of .7% (p-value 0.26), but a larger treatment
effect for version 3 alone, a treatment effect of 3.8% (p-value of .16). The combined impact
shows a treatment effect of 1.0% (p-value of .075).
Table 1.7. Structural Estimation of Treatment Effects
No Multiple Switchers Systematic Multiple Switchers All Subjects
(v1 and v2) (v3) (all) (v1 and v2) (v3) (all) (v1 and v2) (v3) (all)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
High Beliefs 0.498 0.495 0.497 0.501 0.468 0.494 0.496 0.459 0.480
(0.005) (0.020) (0.005) (0.004) (0.020) (0.005) (0.004) (0.014) (0.005)
Low Beliefs 0.491 0.457 0.485 0.493 0.461 0.488 0.496 0.460 0.482
(0.004) (0.018) (0.004) (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.003) (0.015) (0.004)
High Noise 1.915 3.778 2.297 2.734 5.710 3.500 5.223 12.955 7.694
(0.194) (0.423) (0.164) (0.367) (0.818) (0.377) (0.365) (1.407) (0.533)
Low Noise 4.481 11.558 6.588
(0.298) (1.456) (0.499)
Observations 5327 1344 6671 6019 1532 7551 7393 2660 10053
R-squared
Low=High(Beliefs) 0.259 0.160 0.075 0.135 0.791 0.321 0.957 0.948 0.692
Low=High(Noise) 0.116 0.490 0.130
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01
In columns 4 to 6 I include systematic multiple switchers into the sample and
estimate both beliefs and noise separately by treatment. Doing so maintains similar
treatment effects in versions 1 and 2 but lowers the treatment with larger statistical
significance (p-value of .135), but eliminates much of the effect in version 3.
The estimates of the noise parameter by treatment show that noise seems to be
higher in the high access condition than the low. Column 4 for versions 1 and 2 finds a
difference of .1 for the noise parameter (p-value of 0.85) and a difference of 1.5 in column 5
(p-value of .12) in version 3 alone. When I pool the results in column 6 from all versions,
the difference in noise becomes .6 (p-value of .22).
In columns 7 to 9 I include all participants (unique switchers and multiple-switchers)
and estimate both beliefs and noise separately by treatment. Doing so eliminates the
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treatment effects completely in all specifications as the point estimates are close to 0 with
p-values close to 1 in columns 7 and 8 (where I examine treatment effects separately by
version) and a p-value of 0.6 for the estimation in column 9 where I pool the treatments
I conducted the same analysis on the full sample of data - single and multiple
switchers - as well and estimate both beliefs and noise separately by treatment. Doing so
eliminates the treatment effects completely in all specifications as the point estimates are
close to 0 with p-values close to 1 where I examine treatment effects separately by version)
and a p-value of 0.7 for the estimation in column 6 where I pool the versions.
1.7.9 Robustness Checks
Table 1.8. Probability of Violating SEU
Below 50 perc Below 46 perc
Without Controls With Controls Without Controls With Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low Access 0.049 0.052 -0.001 0.007
(0.052) (0.052) (0.046) (0.047)
version 2 = 1 -0.084 -0.176
(0.128) (0.113)
version 3 = 1 -0.186*** 0.049
(0.061) (0.054)
India = 1 0.130 0.142*
(0.079) (0.077)
Constant 0.478 0.462 0.270 0.134
(0.038) (0.073) (0.033) (0.063)
Observations 368 354 368 354
R-squared 0.002 0.060 0.000 0.060
P-value TE = 0 0.351 0.319 0.979 0.876
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01***. This table examines
whether treatment had an impact on the probability that beliefs are above and below different
cutoffs to see if there might be unobserved selection into these subsamples. Columns 1 and 2
examine the 50% cutoff, while columns 3 and 4 examine the 46% cutoff. The reason for using
two cutoffs is that because the belief elicitation is discrete, the 50% cutoff may exclude some
individuals who had beliefs of exactly 50%. Therefore, I also examine effects at the 46% cutoff.
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Chapter 2
Access-based Beliefs: Field Evidence
and Applications
2.1 Introduction
The theory of access-based beliefs proposes that beliefs of an alternative’s value
are based on ones level of access. In particular, the hypothesis is that low access to an
alternative leads to lower beliefs of its value, consistent with the notion of sour grapes.
The first chapter of the dissertation provided a theoretical framework for studying access-
based beliefs, and a proof-of-existence in a lab setting. The key improvement from past
psychology work was to completely control for learning channels and measure beliefs
through incentivized choices over lotteries. This chapter aims to demonstrate how access-
based beliefs may be relevant in real-world settings, and to present evidence from a
randomized field-experiment of sour grapes.
To test the importance of access-based beliefs in an applied setting, I repurpose an
existing field experiment conducted in Los Angeles public high-schools in which access to
a commercially available SAT prep package was randomly assigned to be either 25% (low
access) or 75% (high access) for each student within a classroom (Bursztyn, Egorov, and
Jensen, 2017).1 The design is a close, real-world analogue of the lab experiment. After
1The paper’s original objective was to distinguish between models of social stigma in an environment
where effort is stigmatized and another in which ability is rewarded. The critical test was the opposite sign
prediction in the two environments of the impact of access on package signup conditional on the decision
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privately learning their access level, students were asked whether they would like to signup
for a chance to receive the package for free, and immediately after, were surveyed about
their expected returns of the package (the number of points they think their score would
increase if they got the package). In analyses not done in the original paper, I find that
a reduction in access by 50 p.p. lowers mean beliefs of expected returns to the package
by 125 points (p = .017) (the SAT was out of 2400 points at the time). For robustness
against outliers, I use quantile regression and find that a reduction in access lowers median
expected returns by 100 SAT points from a baseline of 200 in the high access condition (p
¡ .001). The effect on the median represents a 0.2 standard deviation shift of the belief
distribution.2
Overall, the field results confirm the lab findings of the first chapter qualitatively
(evidence of sour grapes) and are similar quantitatively (an effect size of ≈ 0.2 standard
deviations in both settings, although the change in access was 10% larger in the lab). The
two serve as complementary sets of evidence. The lab experiment controls for learning
confounds in the field, and measures belief changes that impact outcomes. The field
experiment tests the theory in a setting with real-world relevance and asks individuals
explicitly what their expected returns to the package are, thus providing more evidence
that belief changes drive the mechanism.
A second hypothesis tested in this chapter is that access-based beliefs are most
prevalent for the poor given that they are likely to face the severest forms of low access to
critical investments. Given their environments, the poor may be the most likely to use sour
grapes as a coping mechanism to deal with lack of accessibility. There is some suggestive
evidence that this may be the case. A long-standing development puzzle is that despite
to sign up (and a corresponding diagnostic test score conditional on winning the package) being made
public. As a control group, half the participant’s decisions were kept private and the paper’s theoretical
model predicts no effect of access on take up in this private condition. The examination of access on
beliefs is thus orthogonal to their paper. I thank the authors profusely for sharing their data with me.
2It should be noted that while the belief elicitations in this study are un-incentivized, the median
expected returns of 100 SAT points is in line with what SAT prep companies advertise and a 1% increase
in beliefs is associated with a 3 to 5 p.p. increase in take-up depending on specification.
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the high estimate returns to technologies like education, healthcare and migration, poor
people appear to underinvest (A. V. Banerjee, A. Banerjee, and Duflo, 2011). A potential
explanation that has been proposed is that underinvestment reflects low beliefs of the
returns on investment, a claim that has been partially substantiated in the literature on
subjective expectations (David McKenzie, 2007; Delavande, 2008; Delavande, Gine´, and
McKenzie, 2011; Jensen, 2010). The standard explanation for low subjective expectations
is that individuals simply have the wrong information or biased sources of information.
However, recent field-experiments find that incentives tailored to education increase beliefs
of the returns to education, despite no information being provided (Duflo, Dupas, and
Benhassine, 2013; S. Sequeira, 2013). While there may be several reasons for this that
have to do with learning or signaling, access-based beliefs provides a potential explanation.
To test the hypothesis that access-based beliefs are more likely to be observed
amongst the poor, both lab and field experiments were conducted in two distinct so-
cioeconomic settings, low-income areas and high-income areas. The lab experiment was
conducted in UC San Diego and a college in Bangalore, India. Compared to UCSD,
students at the Indian college come from an environment where the income distribution
has a higher variance and lower average. While I find significant evidence of a sour grapes
effect in both locations, I find suggestive evidence that the effect is larger in the Indian
sample compared to UCSD by 5.4 p.p. and within India, larger amongst the poor (but the
results are not significant at conventional levels).3 Much more strongly, in the field data, I
find that low access has a 40% larger negative impact on median beliefs in the low-income
school compared to the high-income one (p ¡ .001). Additionally, when decisions are kept
private, low access reduces signup for the package lottery by 18 p.p. (p= .039) for a sample
of high achievers within the low-income school.4 Taken together, the results suggest that
sour grapes may be more prevalent amongst the poor, which may be particularly harmful
3For example, a halving of parental income increases the sour grapes effect by 5.6 p.p. (p= .198).
4Indeed, demand for the package was highest for high achievers in the low-income school compared to
other groups, suggesting a potential reason why sour grapes is more likely to be seen amongst this group.
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since the poor may benefit the most from important investments.
The findings of the second chapter relate to several emerging psychological theories
of poverty. A theoretical literature argues that the poor may suffer from feelings of
hopelessness (Lybbert and Wydick, 2018) and sub-optimal aspirations (Genicot and Ray,
2017) that could perpetuate the cycle of poverty. Indeed, there is growing evidence that
both aspiration-improving interventions and traditional anti-poverty programs create
more optimism about the future, lift people up psychologically, and improve economic
outcomes (A. Banerjee, Duflo, Goldberg, Karlan, Osei, Pariente´, Shapiro, Thuysbaert,
and Udry, 2015; Beaman, Duflo, Pande, and Topalova, 2012; Bernard, Dercon, Orkin, and
Taffesse, 2014; Lybbert and Wydick, 2017). This dissertation contributes by uncovering
one particular belief channel that might be crucial for understanding the positive and
wide-ranging psychological effects observed in these interventions.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.2, I discuss the context
and experimental design and in Section 2.3 I present the results from the field experiment
and the heterogeneity the lab and field results by indicators of poverty; in Section 2.4, I
review evidence from literature on education and health behavior that provide suggestive
evidence of access-based beliefs and in section 2.5, I conclude with a discussion of the
potential policy implications.
2.2 Context and Experimental Design
To test our model of access-based beliefs in the field, I repurpose a field experiment
in which students in three Los Angeles public high-schools were offered a commercially
available SAT prep package for free (Bursztyn, Egorov, and Jensen, 2017). The original
purpose of the paper was to test between different models of social stigma. To this end,
the authors cross two treatments: a public vs. private treatment in which sign up choices
could either be revealed or not revealed to other students in the room and a low vs. high
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probability treatment in which the probability of receiving the prep package was varied
between 25% and 75% conditional on sign up. In addition, for those who win the lottery,
the diagnostic SAT score would be revealed for those in the public information treatment.
The paper uses the sign of the predicted effect of access on package take up in the public
and private condition to distinguish between models of social stigma.
The package included an online app, a diagnostic test, and one-on-one tutoring.
Students were given a description of the package and then offered the following lottery:
If you choose to sign up, your name will be entered into a lottery where you have a
25% (75%) chance of winning the package. Would you like to sign up for a chance to win
the SAT prep package? (Please pick one option) Yes / No
The treatment was varied within classrooms to control for classroom fixed effects,
and probabilities of obtaining the package were privately known to each student. Students
also answered several survey questions including one about their beliefs about the expected
returns of the package. Specifically, after knowing their treatment condition (low or high
access), but before uncertainty was resolved, students were asked the un-incentivized
question: ”How many points do you think this SAT prep package could improve your SAT
test scores by?” Below, I utilize responses to this question and the random variation in
access to test for access-based beliefs in the field.
2.2.1 Connecting the lab and field
While not designed specifically to test access-based beliefs,5 this field experiment is
a close real-world analogue of my lab experiment and presents an opportunity to test the
theory in the field. In both experiments, ex-ante beliefs are elicited about the value of
5The paper varied the probability of receiving treatment in order to distinguish between two different
mechanisms of social stigma, one in which academic effort is frowned upon and another in which low
academic ability comes with a social cost.
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an alternative for which access varies, and in both cases, the alternative is an investment
whose value likely depends on beliefs of its expected returns. There are some notable
differences between the two experiments. (1) In the lab, everyone participates in the
lottery, while in the field, participation is costless in terms of economic resources, but is a
choice variable. (2) In the lab, access varies between 10% and 70%, while the variation is
25% and 75%, slightly less in the field. (3) In the lab, beliefs are elicited indirectly through
incentivized choices in the lab experiment while they are elicited directly in the field.
Two additional features of their design are orthogonal to access-based beliefs but
end up being important in analyzing the data: (1) The authors crossed the probability
treatment (low or high access) with another treatment in which sign up choices could either
be revealed or not revealed to other students in the room (public and private).6 While
orthogonal to access-based beliefs, this impacts the analysis I conduct on the effect of
access on signing up for the package, but not on the analysis of the effect of treatment on
beliefs, since beliefs are not revealed to others. (2) The experiment was conducted in two
types of schools, labeled ”smart-to-be-cool” and ”cool-to-be-smart”. In smart-to-be-cool
schools, the authors expect greater stigmatization of academic effort and thus chose a
lower achieving school with a high share of minority students. In cool-to-be-smart schools,
the authors expect that signaling high ability was more likely to be important and thus
chose a higher achieving schools with lower minority shares.7 This impacts the analysis
for testing access-based beliefs and the sour grapes hypothesis because it is less likely to
be prevalent in schools where academic effort may be stigmatized.
Given this background and experimental design, I proceed to conduct two tests of
6In addition, for those who win the lottery, the diagnostic SAT score might would be revealed for
those in the public information treatment. The paper uses the sign of the predicted effect of access on
package take up in the public and private condition to study a model of social stigma.
7The authors also provide subsequent survey evidence confirming that these two types of schools
do indeed differ in ways that their model and tests are intended to highlight. Students in cool-to-be
smart schools are much more likely to agree that being seen as smart is important for being popular in
their school. The difference is large, about 40% of the standard deviation in responses, and statistically
significant. Students in cool-to-be-smart schools are also more likely to say that if classmates become more
popular because they are studying hard, it is because other students admire hard workers or smart people.
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access-based beliefs (1) That access to the prep package influences beliefs of its value. (2)
That access to the prep package affects actual decisions and outcomes by examining the
impacts on signup for the package.
2.3 Results
Impact of Access on Expected Returns of the SAT Package
To provide a graphical illustration of the treatment effects, Figure 2.1 plots the
density estimates of expected package returns for the low and high access conditions. Most
of the mass in both distributions is concentrated between 0 to 500 points, with about 75%
of the data below 300 SAT points. The median expected return across both treatments
is 100 SAT points which is reassuring since most SAT prep package companies advertise
that their programs can increase scores by 100 points on average. A visual test of the
treatment effect in the range of reasonable expected returns, below 500 points, shows a
clear rightward shift of the distribution for the high probability group, indicating a sour
grapes effect. A two-sample KS test and a Wilcoxon rank-sum test strongly reject the
equality of the overall distributions with p-values of .066 and .021 respectively.
Both distributions have long right tails, in fact, approximately 15% of students
believe their score can go up by 500 points or more, while 8% think their scores can go
up 1000 points or more, improvements which any prep package may struggle to achieve.
Thus, the appropriate regression analysis is likely a quantile regression. In table 2.1, I
examine both average and quantile treatment effects of the impact of access on expected
returns by estimating equation 2.1 below:8
Expected Returnsi = α+β ·Low Accessi+γ ·xi+ν ·z+ i (2.1)
8This analysis that was not carried out in the original paper, but is mostly orthogonal to the findings
in the original paper.
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Figure 2.1. Kernel Density Estimates of Beliefs of SAT Prep Package Effectiveness By
Treatment
,where x indicates student demographic characteristics that include age, ethnicity, gender
and z indicates classroom fixed effects.
Column 1 of table 2.1 presents the results for the full sample of individuals excluding
two individuals who believed their score would go up by more than the SAT score range.9
The coefficient on low access is -102 points (p-value of .079) from a baseline of approximately
400 in the high access group. In column 2 , I control for student demographics including
age, ethnicity, gender, and classroom fixed effects and I find a slightly larger coefficient
(-125 SAT points) and a larger significance level (p-value of .017). These indicate sour
grapes effects of about 0.2 standard deviations of the total expected returns distribution,
a similar effect size to what I find in the lab and strongly significant.
Given the long right tails of the belief distribution, which reflect some unrealistic
expectations of the returns, I examine quantile regressions (columns 3 to 5 of table 2.1) of
the treatment effects at the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantiles. I find consistent evidence of a
sour grapes effect at all these quantiles. At the 25th quantile, I find a sour grapes effect of
9There were only two such outliers, 2800 and 11000
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about 25-30 SAT points, significant with and without controls. At the median, they are
larger - between 50 and 100 SAT points (significant at the 1% level) - and they remain
large but only marginally significant at the 75th quantile (between 100 and 120 points).
Overall, the results show fairly convincing impacts of low access on beliefs in a real-world
setting in the direction of sour grapes.10 This concern is unwarranted as a regression of
take-up on beliefs find no significant effects.
Treatment Effects on Take-up
While I find that changing access to the prep package impacts beliefs of its return,
an important question is whether or not there is any effect on take-up. This may be
unlikely in this context for a few reasons: (1) The package was provided at no charge (2)
For students in the condition where signup decisions were kept private, take-up was 80%
- an already high number (3) Take-up is likely a more complex function of beliefs and
preferences, as demonstrated in the original paper. Therefore, the null hypothesis is that
access-based beliefs will not impact take-up in this setting.
The findings are consistent with the null. I show results in appendix ?? where I
run OLS on equation (1.3) with an indicator for lottery signup as the dependent variable.
Analysis is restricted to the private condition because the public treatment introduces a
social stigma channel which affects the way access influences take-up. In column 1, I find
that the coefficient on take-up is 1.4 p.p. (p-value of .781) and barely changes when I add
controls in column 2. In columns 3 and 4, I restrict analysis to the where there is less
social stigma for academic effort and so there might be a higher likelihood of observing a
sour grapes effect. However, I find no effects in the restricted sample either. One possible
explanation is that in richer schools, students with low access know they will be able to
afford the package even if they lose the lottery, and so, do not respond to treatment.
10One robustness check is that since beliefs were elicited after the take-up decision (but before students
knew if they got the package) there could some effect of take-up on beliefs. This would be hard to identify
since take-up is not randomly assigned, is an outcome variable, and beliefs are also outcome variables.
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Table 2.1. Field Evidence: Impact of Access on Beliefs
Dependent Variable : Expected Returns of Package (units - SAT Points)
Mean Effects Quantile Effects
25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Low Access -102* -125** -30*** -25*** -100*** -50*** -120 -100
(58) (52) (9) (5) (15) (1) (75) (80)
Hispanic = 1 -9 -50*** -50*** -0
(61) (7) (2) (87)
Male = 1 -39 -5 -0 -100
(55) (5) (1) (81)
Student age -4 20*** 39*** -33
(45) (5) (1) (77)
Constant 399 509 90 -165 200 -413 420 1033
(45) (743) (7) (80) (11) (19) (54) (1268)
Observations 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316
R-squared 0.010 0.240
Student Demographics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Classroom FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
P-value: Low Access = 0 0.079 0.017 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.110 0.213
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** . Coefficients in columns (1) and
(2) are from OLS regressions, while coefficients from Columns (3) to (8) are quantile regressions. The
dependent variable is the answer to the question, ”How many points do you think this SAT prep package
could improve your SAT test scores by?” and can only range from 0 - 2400. The coefficient of interest is
”low access” which is an indicator for individuals who had only a 25% chance of winning the SAT prep
package.
Overall it seems that while the expected returns of the SAT prep package were
influenced by access, there is no indication that take up was impacted.
2.3.1 Access-based Beliefs and Poverty
A deeper understanding of the theory may be gained from examining whether
individuals who face severely low access to desirable alternatives have a lower or higher
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prevalence of access-based beliefs. One could imagine that either (a) greater exposure to
low access pushes individuals to find coping mechanisms, or (b) individuals learn to live
with low access over time and therefore rely less on sour grapes to feel better.
Some real-world evidence suggests the possibility of the former. Surveys in develop-
ing countries find that poor people have low beliefs of the returns to investing in education,
health and migration when compared to estimates from data (Attanasio and Kaufmann,
2012; David McKenzie, 2007; Jensen, 2010) and recent field experiments in development
contexts find that incentives tailored to education increased beliefs of the returns to
education, despite no specific information about the returns being provided (Duflo, Dupas,
and Benhassine, 2013; S. Sequeira, 2013), though mechanisms were unexplored. In this
section, heterogeneous treatment effects by indicators of poverty are examined in both
the lab and field. Overall, I find evidence that the sour grapes effect is larger in poorer
environments and greater amongst poorer individuals in both the lab and field, with the
field evidence being stronger than the lab.
Sour Grapes Heterogeneity By Poverty Indicators: Lab Evidence
The primary reason for conducting the study in a developing country was to test
access-based beliefs in an environment where low access to alternatives may be more
prevalent. Columns 1 and 2 of table 2.2 show the main difference in treatment effects
between the Indian and the UCSD sample. The coefficient on the interaction term between
low access and an India indicator is -4.5 p.p. (p-value of .254) without controls (column 1)
and -5.2 p.p. (p-value of .204) with controls (column 2). These results are not significant,
but are directionally consistent with a larger sour grapes effect in the environment with
greater poverty and economic disparity. Further data on self-reported parental income,
parental education and student allowance was collected in the Indian sample providing
some idea of the socioeconomic background of subjects.11 Despite being underpowered
11Specifically, I asked subjects to report (1) the estimate of their parents total income last year before
taxes (2) the education level of the highest earning member of their household (3) their allowance per
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due to a small sample, the point estimates on interaction terms between treatment and
each of these demographic characteristics are large and negative, showing a consistent
pattern of a greater sour grapes effect for poorer individuals (columns 3 to 6, Table 2.2)
within India.12
Table 2.2. Treatment Effects By Poverty Indicators : Lab Results
Dependent Variable : Beliefs of a High Payout from Subjective Lottery
Covariate : Developing Log Parental Allowance ¡ Household Head Poverty
Country Income 40th percentile Graduate Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low Access -0.013 -0.013 -0.197* -0.040 -0.065 -0.036
(0.017) (0.017) (0.115) (0.060) (0.051) (0.059)
Covariate -0.007 -0.033 -0.027 -0.009 -0.015 -0.032
(0.030) (0.038) (0.032) (0.064) (0.099) (0.041)
Low Access×Covariate -0.045 -0.052 0.056 -0.060 -0.076 -0.067
(0.040) (0.041) (0.043) (0.092) (0.120) (0.061)
Constant 0.521 0.519 0.629 0.611 0.588 0.644
(0.013) (0.019) (0.129) (0.116) (0.085) (0.054)
Observations 368 354 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.020 0.071 0.182 0.165 0.165 0.207
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value Interaction = 0 0.254 0.204 0.198 0.512 0.525 0.273
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** . All regressions estimated using OLS
and are conducted only on version 3 of the experiment which was done in both India and the US. All poverty
indicators are based on subject self-reports. The column headings indicate the covariate for which I analyze
heterogeneous treatment effects. In (1) and (2), the covariate is an indicator for the experiment being conducted
in India. In (3), it is an estimate of parents total income last year before taxes. In (5) it is the education level
of the highest earning member of their household. In (4), it is whether the allowance (aside from boarding and
lodging) is below the 40th percentile of the allowance distribution which is $60. In (6) it is a a poverty index
ranging from 0 to 3 constructed from columns 3 to 5. Due to some subjects not responding to the parental
income question, we lose about 20% of the data in the Indian sample. The coefficient of interest is the interaction
term in row 3. The controls used include gender, dummies for year of college, and whether the participant took
decisions-under-uncertainty class.
Sour Grapes Heterogeneity By Poverty Indicators: Field Evidence
Unlike the lab experiment, the field experiment did not collect self-reported measures
of income and economic background. However, as mentioned earlier, the authors selected
one lower-income and lower-achieving school - the smart-to-be-cool school, and two higher-
month aside from boarding and lodging costs.
12In all specifications, I interact treatment with one of these indicators while controlling for the others.
The correlation between these measures is at most .38 (between parental income and education level of
the household head) and only .16 (between monthly allowance and education level of the household head)
suggesting these proxies are independent measures of poverty.
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income and higher- achieving schools - the cool-to-be-smart schools.13
In table 2.3, column 1, I examine the heterogeneous impacts of low access on median
expected returns of the SAT package by an indicator for the poorer school. I find that the
interaction term has a coefficient of -83.33 (p-value of .000). In column 3, I conduct the
same analysis but with package signup as the outcome variable. The coefficient on the
interaction term is -1.0 p.p., directionally consistent with sour grapes, but insignificant.
Overall, these results are consistent with the lab: the grapes effect is larger in the poorer
environment.
In column 2, I focus only on poor schools and examine the treatment effects by
whether a student’s grades were below or above the median.14 The reason being that
high achieving students from poor schools are likely to have a higher demand for the SAT
prep package since they appear to care about grades and are poorer than their rich-school
counterparts, and so may be more likely to respond to the treatment. Indeed, conditional
on being in the poor school and in the private treatment condition, the signup rates of high
achieving students are 24% higher than low achievers (p-value of .000). I first examine
heterogeneity of the treatment effects by self-reported achievement on median expected
returns (column 2). The interaction term is -30, showing greater sour grapes for the high
achievers, but this effect is not significant.
In columns 4 to 6, I conduct the same analysis, but this time, on the dependent
13See Bursztyn, Egorov, and Jensen (2017) for specific ethnic, scholastic and income-based, differences
between the two schools that strongly reflect the differences in poverty levels between the schools. As an
example, the median income in the poor school ZIP code is about $44,000, and the average SAT score is
around 1,200. By contrast, averaging across the second and third schools where it is cool-to-be-smart, the
median income is about $66,000 and the average SAT score is around 1,500. They also compare these
schools to a sample of138 LAUSD high schools and find that the first school appears close to the median
public high school on poverty indicators while the latter two schools are in the bottom 5th percentile of
poverty.
14The original paper uses this measure to examine heterogeneous treatment effects in the context of
peer pressure, and tries to divide the data as close to the median response as possible. I follow the same
as this is the only sensible partition. The partition is made at the 70th percentile of responses. Students
above the 70th percentile report having Mostly A’s or mostly A’s and B’s, while students below the 70th
percentile report having Mostly B’s and C’s, C’s and D’s and D’s and F’s. There are only 5 students who
report having mostly A’s, and the modal response is mostly B’s and C’s, so the partition used is the only
sensible one.
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variable ”take-up”. In all specifications, I control for an indicator of the public treatment
and the interaction between low access and public, because each of these variable has its
own impact on signup, as theorized in the original paper. As seen in column 4, when I
include all students in the poor school, regardless of grades, I find that low access has no
impact on signup. I then run the same analysis separately for low and high achievers. I
find that for low achievers, low access has no impact on signup (column 5), but for high
achievers, who have a higher demand for the package, low access lowers take-up by 18
p.p. (p-value of .039) (column 6). This suggests that for this subsample of high achieving,
poorer students, low access has an independent effect on take-up. This effect is orthogonal
to the model of negative social stigma being tested, but is as large as some of the negative
peer pressure effects found in the original paper. By contrast, access has no impact on
signup rates of high achieving students from rich schools who were also in the private
treatment.
Thus, it seems that amongst high achieving, poor students, there is evidence of
sour grapes in actual take up decisions in a setting that was designed to test a completely
different question. This result is consistent with the notion that poor people appear more
likely to use sour grapes as a defense mechanism when faced with low access.
2.4 Evidence for Access-Based Beliefs in Applied
Settings
While no prior study in economics has specifically tested the hypothesis of access-
based beliefs, there is suggestive evidence in the form of experimental results and stylized
facts that indicate its possible prevalence and implications for real-world problems.
2.4.1 Field Experiments in Education
In education, a couple of recent field-experiments have looked at the effects of
education programs on perceptions of the returns to education. In particular, S. Sequeira
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(2013) utilize a regression-discontinuity design framework based on receipt of a fellowship
to an elite school in India as an instrument to estimate the effect of schooling on an
individual’s perception of future returns. The paper finds that educational rewards have a
positive and statistically significant effect on the perceived returns to education of awardees
and a reduction in its variance with evidence that the fellowship changed the individual’s
overall valuation of education. In other recent work, Duflo, Dupas, and Benhassine (2013)
implement both a conditional and an unconditional cash transfer program in Morocco that
is labeled and promoted as an education program. The authors find that both programs
increased perceptions of the returns to education and improved school enrollment even
though no information was provided about the returns to education.
Both papers suggest that perceptions change because the education program
provides new information on the returns to education. However, this interpretation is
somewhat puzzling given that none of the programs implemented directly provide any
information on the returns to education and yet they influence beliefs. The argument made
is that the programs serve as a signal about the overall returns to education, for example,
by strengthening the perceived link between schooling effort and success (S. Sequeira,
2013) or by signaling that the government must believe that the returns are high (Duflo,
Dupas, and Benhassine, 2013). However, the evidence for either of these mechanisms is
lacking. Furthermore, S. Sequeira (2013) finds that there are no belief spillovers from
the individuals who received the scholarship to their friends or neighbors as one might
expect if the learning story was true. Our combined lab and field evidence shows that
access-based beliefs exist and can explain the findings in these studies.
2.4.2 Empirical Observations in Health Behavior
Access-based beliefs may explain a set of stylized facts in the empirical literature on
health behavior. This literature documents that individuals have optimistic beliefs about
health risks (Oster, Shoulson, and Dorsey, 2013; Weinstein, 1982) which become more
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unrealistic in resource-constrained settings (A. V. Banerjee, A. Banerjee, and Duflo, 2011)
where an individuals’ ability to access healthcare may be low. Furthermore, consumer
demand for healthcare in developing countries appears to be highly sensitive to changes in
prices (Cohen and Dupas, 2010; Dupas, 2011).
While other explanations are possible to explain each of these facts individually,
a recent theoretical paper by Schwardmann (2019) attempts a unifying explanation.
Individuals deal with the anxiety of ill-health in one of two ways. They either engage in
denial (denialists) of the chance of falling ill, or they take preventative measures (realists)
and when an agent has a limited ability to act, the former becomes the more attractive
option.15 Schwardmann notes several interesting implications of this model for market
design: (1) Due to greater access, beliefs about the risk of ill-health are higher in low-price
environments of perfect competition than under monopoly (2) However, because denialists
are more sensitive to price changes, since prices impact their beliefs, monopolists may
charge them a lower price (3) Overall, the low demand of denialists may influence the
amount of investment in research and development observed in healthcare markets.
2.5 Conclusion
Access-based beliefs are the notion that beliefs of an alternative’s value are a
function of the likelihood it obtains. For example, individuals may have lower beliefs of
alternatives to which they have low access, an effect I call sour grapes. I first test this
notion in the lab, in chapter 1, and find that a low chance of obtaining a subjective lottery
reduces beliefs of the probability that it yields a high payout. I next corroborate this
finding in the field, in chapter 2, by repurposing a field experiment in which access to a
commercial, free SAT prep package was varied. I find that lower access to the package
reduced beliefs of its expected return.
15In fact, Schwardmann cites the first two chapters of this dissertation as providing empirical evidence
from the lab and field of his proposed model.
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The significance of access-based beliefs could be large for groups of people who
face very low access to important investments. A critical example might be poor people
who often face low access to investments and therefore, may formulate low beliefs about
the returns. I find suggestive evidence that access-based beliefs may be more prevalent
amongst poor people. Individuals from poorer backgrounds displayed a larger sour grapes
effect in both the lab and field contexts. This result is striking and begs the question of
whether poor people have learned to use sour grapes as a coping mechanism for low access,
or whether some other variable maybe driving the differential prevalence amongst the
poor, and whether access-based beliefs could be at the root of a belief-based poverty trap.
Perhaps the most critical insight of access-based beliefs for policy-makers or firms
trying to estimate demand is that belief elicitations may be wrong and influenced by
access. Low beliefs may not represent a lack of information, but simply, a lack of access.
A potential way to distinguish between whether an individual has wrong information
or is engaging in access-based beliefs might be to increase access to an investment and
observe the effects on beliefs. While pessimistic individuals would increase their beliefs
in both situations, optimistic individuals may react differently. If beliefs are a function
of information, then optimistic individuals should lower beliefs following an increase in
access as they learn about an alternative’s value. However, access-based beliefs suggest
that optimistic individuals should increase their beliefs even further when access increases.
The theory of access-based beliefs suggests a novel mechanism for the impact of
social programs that expand access, namely that they impact beliefs as well. Further
work could look to quantify the impacts different interventions and policies have on
beliefs. For instance, if a policy-maker was trying to increase purposefully-held low beliefs
about the value of an investment, would providing cash, which would increase access
to multiple investments simultaneously, be more effective than providing a subsidy or
voucher? Ultimately, the answers to such questions, and to the general impacts of different
interventions, may be informed by a greater understanding of access-based beliefs.
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Chapter 1 and 2 in full are being combined and prepared for submission for
publication of the material. The dissertation author, Vinayak Alladi was the primary
investigator and author of this material.
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Chapter 3
An (Other Person’s) Endowment Ef-
fect: A Test of Social Reference De-
pendence
3.1 Introduction
The impact of social comparisons and interaction have been documented in a variety
of settings, including financial decisions (Bursztyn, Ederer, Ferman, and Yuchtman, 2014),
educational outcomes (Zimmerman, 2003), choice of social groups (Sacerdote, 2001) and
voting behavior (Harmon, Fisman, and Kamenica, 2017). The theoretical foundations
of peer effects fall into two broad categories, as classified in Bursztyn, Ederer, Ferman,
and Yuchtman (2014): social learning models, where individuals learn from the actions
of others (A. V. Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992), and social
utility models where utility is derived from making social comparisons (Festinger, 1954).
This paper focuses on understanding whether individuals derive utility from making social
comparisons in the context of consumption goods. Past work has suggested that conformity
in consumption could be driven via the former learning channel, as individuals learn from
the consumption choices of others (Moretti, 2011) or via social signaling (Bernheim, 1994),
as when individual’s engage in conspicuous consumption to signal social status (Veblen,
1899). By contrast, this paper examines how social comparisons may influence consumption
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choices in a basic exchange setting with standard consumption goods where learning forces
and signaling motives are minimized. Given a distribution of consumption, individuals
with a preference for conformity may want to emulate the majority, while those with a
preference for non-conformity, may choose to deviate from the popular choice and choose
the less popular good.
Standard economic theory says that when given a choice between two goods, an
individual should choose the good they prefer more. However, an extensive experimental
literature on behavior in exchange environments has largely focused on documenting and
explaining the endowment effect: the finding that initial ownership of an object increases
its valuation and reduces the desire to trade it away (Kahneman, Knetsch, and R. H.
Thaler, 1991; R. Thaler, 1980; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). One unrealistic aspect of
these settings is that the distribution of objects is often, though not always initially equal.1
By contrast, in the real world, endowments and exchanges do not occur in a vacuum and
individuals can observe a distribution of an object’s possession. Given the strong evidence
of peer effects and social comparisons, it seems natural to ask: in addition to one’s own
endowment, does the distribution of possession of a consumption object in society impact
exchange behavior. Consider an initial distribution of endowments where a small portion of
people are given a mug while everyone else is given a pen. Standard reference dependence
would argue that loss aversion around a reference point would be the correct model to
describe exchange behavior, and that regardless of the skewed distribution towards pens,
mug (pen) assignees are more likely to want to keep the mug (pen), thus yielding the
familiar endowment effect, and lowering exchange behavior overall. However, if individuals
make social comparisons, then there may also be a desire to conform, by some mug owners
choosing the pen, or to distinguish oneself and feel special, by some pen owners choosing
the mug, thus potentially altering the level of trade observed.
1For example, in (Heffetz and List, 2014) individuals are randomly assigned mugs and pens, so the
distribution is likely to not always be 50-50, leading to more pen or mug owners in a room.
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To structure these ideas, I employ the prominent model of reference dependence in
the literature, the KR (Koszegi-Rabin) model, in which the reference point is based on
an individual’s rational expectations, i.e., expectations about future outcomes generated
by consumption plans (Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006), and apply it to an exchange setting.
I consider a decision-maker who has consumption utility, standard gain-loss utility, and
an additional source of social gain-loss utility, which is the utility experienced from
social comparisons to the choices of others. In particular, individuals compare their own
consumption bundle to the utility they would get from the consumption bundle of others.
As an example, an individual that possesses a mug while others possess a pen, feels a utility
gain from the mug and a utility loss from not owning the pen scaled by a social gain-loss
utility parameter which can differ from the standard gain-loss utility with respect to their
own outcomes. The definition of conformity and non-conformity arises from considering
values of the social gain-loss utility behavior for which individuals choose to emulate or
deviate from the actions of others. Specifically, individuals who are loss-averse with respect
to the outcomes of others will increase their consumption of a good as the share of other
individuals consuming it increases (conformers), while individuals who are gain-seeking
with respect to the outcomes of others will decrease their consumption as the share of
other individuals consuming it increases (non-conformers).
In order to make predictions of choice behavior, I first treat the social distribution
as an exogenous object and consider the notion of personal equilibrium in KR where an
individual’s actions and expectations are consistent with each other. This may be relevant
in real life situations where my reference group is large, and my own actions have little
impact on the social distribution. I show that under this notion of personal equilibrium,
an individual’s decisions to keep or exchange their endowed object depends on the relative
magnitudes of standard and social gain-loss utility. If standard loss aversion is relatively
larger, individuals are more likely to exhibit the endowment effect. However, if loss
aversion with respect to other people’s outcomes is relatively larger, then the distribution
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of consumption choices will likely impact the total amount of observed exchange.
To test the proposed model of conformity and non-conformity, I conduct a sequen-
tial game in the lab where subjects take turns making choices between two standard
consumption goods (a mug and a pen) and can observe the choices made by players
who moved before them. I use the strategy method to elicit preferences, i.e. subjects
are asked to state their preference between a pen and mug at each possible decision
node of the game before the game is played. In the end, one of the subject’s choices is
implemented by assigning a randomly chosen number between 1 and N (where N is the
total number of players) to each subject and implementing decisions in ascending order of
the numbers assigned. By design, there are no additional material incentives to coordinate
on consumption choices besides getting the desired object, and there are limited motives
to signal status, as subjects come into the lab not knowing each other. Additionally, social
learning is arguably non-existent as subjects get to examine both subjects at the start of
the experiment, and are told that there are enough mugs and pens for everyone.
Data was collected on 3 versions of the above design at UC San Diego. A 5-
player version of the game, and a 3-player version of the game. The 3-player version was
additionally done with and without a randomly assigned initial endowment. A total of 20
sessions of this study were conducted, 10 of them consisted of the 5-player version (data
for 50 subjects x 15 decisions each) and 10 of them consisted of the 3-player version (data
for 30 subjects x 6 decisions each2
Our primary identification strategy is to examine decisions made as the last player
to move in the game. The key test of conformity, as defined by our model, is an individual
choosing the mug when more prior participants chose the mug and the pen when more
prior participants chose the pen. The opposite behavior is identified as non-conformity.
Since all uncertainty is resolved by the last row of the game, using these decisions cleanly
2The total number of decisions for the with endowment experiment could have been 9 decisions,
depending on the initial endowment. This will be fully explained in section 3.1.
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identifies an individual’s social preferences as no assumptions are required on beliefs about
future play. The strength of conformity and non-conformity can be further understood by
examining what individuals do for different values of the proportion of mug choosers thus
far.
Overall I find that a small portion of individuals exhibit behavior that is consistent
with having social preferences as defined by our model. While 60% of subjects choose
their preferred object, 13.75% of the subjects exhibit a preference for non-conformity, 7.5%
reveal a preference for conformity and the remaining 18.75% choose randomly. To test
whether the data observed could have been generated by individuals choosing randomly, I
use a binomial distribution to calculate the null distribution of random choice. I strongly
reject that our data could have been generated randomly at the 5% level for the 5-player
version but do not reject this for the 3-player version, where the probability of observing
social preferences randomly is much higher.
I next test for rationalizability of the choices of individuals who I identified as
conformers and non-conformers at the last stage of the game, in earlier stages. I use two
definitions of rationalizability, one termed weak rationalizability which is the standard
notion of rationalizability that admits any feasible beliefs, and the other termed strong
rationalizability, which requires some consistency in beliefs across different stages of the
game. I find that about half of our subjects identified as having social preferences have
choices consistent with even strong rationalizability. Interestingly, I find suggestive evidence
that rationality appears stronger amongst non-conformers, as non-conformers commit less
violations of rationality, suggesting that non-conformity preferences may be more stable.
A second set of analyses tests the strength of the standard endowment effect in
our setting. Our model predicts that the endowment effect could be dampened in our
setting where people may respond to the social distribution. Given random assignment
into the “with” and “without” endowment treatment groups, we would expect that the
presence of the endowment effect should raise the proportion of times individuals endowed
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with a mug will choose the mug relative to the without-endowment treatment, and vice
versa for the pen. While there are differences in the point estimates between these groups,
there is no consistent pattern in the signs of the treatment effects (they are sometimes
positive and sometimes negative) and I strongly fail to reject the null of no endowment
effect (p-values 0.5 on average). However, given the small sample size of the experiment,
I am likely underpowered to detect small endowment effects if they exist. Secondly, the
theory predicts that we expect to observe less conformity and non-conformity overall in
the with-endowment treatment relative to without. While there is some evidence of this,
our sample size is too small to reject equality between the two treatments. Taken together,
our results do suggest that social considerations appear to crowd out the endowment effect.
The study contributes to a large literature on social comparisons, finding novel
evidence that individuals have preferences for conformity and non-conformity even with
standard consumption goods. I examine goods that carry no special status, an environment
in which there are no material payoffs from coordination and one in which signaling motives
are likely low. Simply providing information on the consumption choices of others leads
to emulation by about half of the subjects who respond to some groups of subjects and
deviance for others. While most studies in this literature find evidence for conformity, or
emulating the choices of others, our study finds an equally large number of non-conformers.
Secondly, the study contributes to the literature on expectations-based endowment
effects which has found mixed results for the predictions of the KR model. Marzilli Ericson
and Fuster (2011) (FE) find evidence in favor of expectations-based reference points, while
Heffetz and List (2014) (HL) and Goette, Harms, and Sprenger (2014) (GHS) find results
in favor of the status quo. One potential explanation is that social comparisons were very
different in FE vs. HL and GS. In FE, the status quo across subjects are identical as no
one is given an endowment, but what varies between subjects in the same session is the
probability of permission to exchange. In HL and GHS, the initial endowments between
subjects within a session vary, but the expected permission to exchange within a session
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are fixed. I argue that some of these differences may be explained by how subjects compare
their own endowments and outcomes to others. In particular, low levels of exchange may
be reflective of not only endowment effects, but of social comparisons between groups who
were assigned different objects or faced different expectations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 3.2, I present the theoretical
model that guides the experimental work and in Section 3.3, I discuss and provide details
on the experimental design; in Section 3.4, I present the results from the lab experiment;
in Section 3.5, I discuss the results of the paper and suggest further avenues of work and
in Section 3.6 I conclude.
3.2 Theory
3.2.1 Preliminaries
Following Koszegi and Rabin (2006 and 2007), let c represent an outcome vector
drawn from the measure F, and r represent a reference point vector drawn from the
measure G. Then, the utility function, U(F—G) evaluates the consumption lottery F in
comparison to the referent lottery G as follows: U(F |G) = ∫∫ u(c|r)dG(r)dF (c) where
u(c|r) =∑Kk=1mk(ck) +∑Kk=1µ(mk(ck)−mk(rk)), the function m(·) represents consump-
tion utility, and the function µ(·) represents gain-loss utility relative to the referent,
r.
Assume that for small-stakes decisions, consumption utility, m(·), can be plausibly
regarded as approximately linear, and a piecewise-linear gain-loss utility function is adopted
as follows. 3
µ(x) =

x x≥ 0
λ ·x x < 0
3In the case of an exchange setting, this assumption may be even less restrictive as individuals are
simply choosing over consumption items.
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To incorporate social preferences, I assume that the individual also compares their
outcomes to those of others in the population, borrowing a functional form similar to one of
the seminal models of social preferences, Fehr and Schmidt (FS). (Fehr and K. M. Schmidt,
1999) Specifically, I assume that individuals experience a utility loss in the form of envy
when they are behind others, and a utility gain when they are ahead. Unlike FS, since
individuals are not being asked to allocate an object. I believe that guilt is unlikely to
play much of a role in an exchange setting.
With this motivation, I augment the KR utility function by adding a social gain-loss
component. Specifically, an individual compares their consumption outcome to that of
every other individual in society. A question arises as to whether the relevant social
comparison is the initial endowment of others (or the object they currently possess) or
their expected consumption outcomes. To simplify the analysis, I first assume that the
relevant comparison is the initial endowment, and solve for personal equilibria under this
assumption.4 For notation, let c1 indicate the consumption of individual 1 and cj represent
the initial endowments of all individuals, c2, c3, ....cN .
u(c1|r,c2, c3, ....cN ) =
K∑
k=1
mk(c1k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Consumption Utility
+
K∑
k=1
µs(mk(c1k)−mk(r1k))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Individual Gain-Loss Utility
+
1
N −1
K∑
k=1
N∑
j=2
µo(mk(c1k)−mk(cjk))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Social Gain-Loss Utility
(3.1)
where µo, the social gain-loss utility, is assumed to be plausibly linear for small
stakes, just as is assumed for individual gain-loss utility, as follows:
4In the next section, I consider the case where the comparison point is expected consumption, and
following the rational expectations framework laid out in KR, I define a notion of social equilibrium in
which the comparison point is based on the expected consumption outcomes of other individuals which
have to be choices others would rationally make.
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µ(x) =

x x≥ 0
λs ·x x < 0
The above utility function is a reference dependent utility function (RDU) with
social comparisons, or henceforth referred to as the social RDU. Importantly, I allow the
function for social gain-loss utility, µsocial or µs to be different from standard reference
dependence, µindividual or µI and under our assumption of linear gain-loss utility, λsocial
or λs can be different from λindividual or λI . I also preserve anonymity across individuals,
in that any interchange of labels would not impact the final utility.5 Furthermore, I do
not place weights on the individual terms in the utility function, but this could matter in
some applications if individual gain-loss utility becomes more relevant than social gain-loss
utility or vice-versa.
KR define an equilibrium concept called personal equilibrium (PE) in which: (1)
an agent’s choice maximizes her utility given her expectations (2) an agent’s expectations
(and hence, her reference point) are rational, in that they are based on the outcomes that
would result if the agent follows through on her plan. Formally, consider a choice set D ,
composed of lotteries, F , over consumption outcomes c.
Personal Equilibrium (PE): A choice F ∈D, is a personal equilibrium if:
U(F |F )≥ U(F ′|F ) ∀F ′ ∈D
3.2.2 Exchange Behavior under a Social KR Framework
I now consider exchange behavior in a social KR model. Consider a standard
exchange environment where individuals are endowed with either a mug or a pen and
5One could imagine augmenting the utility function so that there are weights on each social comparison
pair, perhaps because comparisons to individuals with authority or popularity matter more than others
but that a status-seeking motive that is not the focus of this model.
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choose whether they would rather keep their endowment or exchange it for the other
object. Thus, the utility function is over two dimensions, mugs, m, and pens, p such that
c1 = (m,p) , cj = (m,p) and rj = (mj ,pj). The value m∈ {0,M} indicates the consumption
utility of having no mug, or one mug, and p ∈ (0,P ) is the utility from having no pen or
one pen. Under the linear gain-loss utility specified above, the social RDU in this case is:
u(c1|r) = u(m,p|r1m, r1p, r2m, r2p, .......rNm , rNp ) =m+p+µs(m− rm) +µs(p− rp)+
1
N −1
N∑
j=2
[µo(m−mj) +µo(p−pj)]
(3.2)
The assumption of linearity of the social comparison term µo allows us to summarize
the social gain-loss for a mug owner (respectively, pen owner) by comparing her outcomes
to the proportion of other individuals, denoted (1−pim) (respectively, pim) who own a pen
(mug). Compared to other individuals who own a mug, the mug owner faces no social
gain-loss since her consumption is the same in all consumption dimensions.
3.2.3 Personal Equilibria in Exchange Environments
Two types of personal equilibria may persist for mug and pen owners; those in which
individuals do not expect to exchange (and therefore do not exchange) and those in which
they expect to exchange (and therefore exchange). Keep in mind that for mug owners
(pen owners) the expectation to not exchange is the one most conducive to generating the
standard endowment effect. However, I will show that if the impact of social comparisons
in the utility function is large enough, then this could result in a PE in which some
individuals who expected to keep their object, decide to exchange. Going through the
derivations of equilibrium threshold values below is a useful exercise to later understand
how they are impacted by changes in the social distribution of ownership.
Mug Owner: Consider a mug owner with a reference point of keeping the mug,
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(rm, rp) = (M,0). The mug owner has to choose between keeping the mug, yielding
consumption outcome (m,p) = (M,0) and giving it up for a pen, yielding consumption
outcome (m,p) = (0,P ). The social distribution of endowments is characterized by pim,
the proportion of individuals endowed with the mug, and (1−pim), the proportion of
individuals endowed with a pen. Thus, according to the social RDU, the individual can
support keeping the mug in personal equilibrium, if:
u(M,0|M,0,pim,(1−pim))> u(0,P |M,0,pim,(1−pim)),
or
um+ (1−pim)(um−λsup)︸ ︷︷ ︸
social gain-loss
> up+ (up−λIum)︸ ︷︷ ︸
indiv. gain-loss
+pim(up−λsum)︸ ︷︷ ︸
social gain-loss
(3.3)
In words, keeping the mug is a PE if the utility of keeping the mug is greater than
that of exchanging it for the pen, given a mug owner expects to keep the mug.
The highest utility of the pen for which mug owners can support keeping the mug
in PE can be found by solving for up in eq. (3):
up
keep mug = um(2 +pim(λs−1) +λI)(2 +pim(1−λs) +λs) (3.4)
The above equation gives the maximum utility of a pen for which the individual
can support keeping the mug. Notice that this threshold value is increasing in standard
loss aversion , λI , and in the utility of the pen, um. I later discuss how it varies with pim.
A second PE can exist in which mug owners expect to exchange. Given the
expectation to exchange, the referent becomes 0 mugs and 1 pen (0, P) and the individual
can support exchange in personal equilibrium, if:
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u(0,P |0,P,pim,(1−pim))> u(M,0|0,P,pim,(1−pim)),
or
up+pim(up−λsum)︸ ︷︷ ︸
social gain-loss
> um+ (1−pim)(um−λsup)︸ ︷︷ ︸
social gain-loss
+(um−λIup)︸ ︷︷ ︸
indiv. gain-loss
(3.5)
up
exchange for pen = um(3 +pim(λs−1))(1 +pim(1−λs) +λs+λI) (3.6)
This equation gives the minimum utility of a pen for which exchanging the mug for
a pen could be supported in PE. Any utility lower than this means that exchanging the
mug for the pen could not be supported in equilibrium.
Pen Owners: Similarly, consider an individual initially endowed with a pen.
Again, I consider two types of PE, one in which the individual expects to keep the pen,
and the other in which she expects to exchange the pen for a mug. In the first case,
the reference point is the initial endowment, (0,P ), which is the one most conducive to
generating an endowment effect for the pen. The pen owner contemplates both keeping
the pen, yielding consumption outcome (m,p) = (0,P ), and exchanging the pen for a mug,
yielding consumption outcome (m,p) = (M,0).
As before, pim and (1−pim) represents the proportion of individuals endowed with a
mug and pen, respectively. Thus, according to the social RDU, the individual can support
keeping the pen in PE if:
u(0,P |0,P,pim,(1−pim))> u(M,0|0,P,pim,(1−pim)),
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or
up+pim(up−λsum)︸ ︷︷ ︸
social gain-loss
> um+ (1−pim)(um−λsup)︸ ︷︷ ︸
social gain-loss
+(um−λIup)︸ ︷︷ ︸
indiv. gain-loss
(3.7)
up
keep pen = um(3 +pim(λs−1))(1 +pim(1−λs) +λs+λI) (3.8)
Note that since the valuations of pens and mugs are closely tied to expected
exchange behavior, the minimum value of a pen at which a pen owner can support keeping
the pen in PE is identical to the lowest value of a pen at which a mug owner can support
trading a mug for a pen, upkeep pen = upexchange for pen. In a similar fashion, I can calculate
the maximum value of a pen at which a pen owner can support exchanging for a mug in
PE: upexchange for mug = upkeep mug.
3.2.4 Social Dynamics of the model
Defining Conformers and Non-conformers
To understand how the social distribution may impact equilibrium behavior in
this model and how I define conformity and non-conformity, I examine how the utility
thresholds for personal equilibria change as I manipulate pim. To do this, I differentiate
the threshold utilities found in the previous section with respect to pim. It is adequate to
look at one of the thresholds, since the other threshold varies only up to a constant. Thus,
I consider how upkeep mug (the maximum utility of a pen at which a mug owner can still
support keeping the mug in equilibrium) varies with pim.
dup
keep mug
dpim
= um(λs−1)(λI +λs+ 4)(2 +pim(1−λs) +λs)2 (3.9)
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Proposition 3.1. For λs > 1,upkeep mug is increasing in pim, while for λs < 1,upkeep mug
is decreasing in pim for all values of λI > 0
Proof. As can be seen, when λI is greater than 1, the numerator is positive and dup
keep mug
dpim
>
0, while when λs is less than 1, the numerator is negative and dup
keep mug
dpim
< 0 This holds
true for any value of λI greater than 0. When λI = 1, the derivative is zero.
Proposition 3.1 shows that for a mug owner for whom λI > 1, an increase in the
proportion of mugs raises the maximum utility of a pen at which they can support keeping
the mug in equilibrium. In other words, a higher proportion of mug owners leads this
individual to be more likely to keep the mug, and I call such an individual a conformer.
Conversely, for a mug owner for whom λI < 1, an increase in the proportion of mugs
lowers the maximum utility of a pen at which they can support exchanging for the pen in
equilibrium. In other words, a higher proportion of mug owners leads this individual to
be more likely to exchange for the mug, and I call such an individual a non-conformer.
When λI > 1, the derivative is zero, and the threshold value is un-impacted by the value
of pim. The individual has no gain-loss utility with respect to other people’s possessions.
Figure 3.1 (figure 3.2) show how the threshold value of a pen for which individuals
are willing to keep or exchange their good vary as a function of pim for conformers (non-
conformers) relative to individuals who have no kink in social gain-loss utility, i.e. for whom
λs = 1. The two dashed lines show the thresholds utility values of a pen at which mug
owners can support keeping (in black) and exchanging (in red) their objects in equilibrium
for the parameter values λs = 1 and λI = 1.2. The gap between the two lines illustrates
the standard endowment effect. For these individuals, who have no social preferences,
varying pim has no impact on the willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept thresholds.
The black and red solid lines in figure 1 represent the change in these thresholds
for exchange when λs increases to a value of 1.2 and individuals exhibit a preference for
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Figure 3.1. Personal Equilibria as a function of the endowment distribution for Con-
formers
conformity. As demonstrated in proposition 3.1, this leads to a lower threshold willingness
to keep the mug (exchange for the pen) when pim < 0.5 and a higher willingness to keep
the mug (exchange for the pen) when pim > 0.5. Similarly, black and red solid lines in
figure 2 represent the change in these thresholds for exchange when λs decreases to a
value of 0.8 and individuals exhibit a preference for non-conformity. This leads to a higher
threshold willingness to keep the mug (exchange for the pen) when pim < 0.5 and a lower
willingness to keep the mug (exchange for the pen) when pim > 0.5.
Personal Equilibria Thresholds and Individual gain-loss utility λI
A second comparative static of interest is how increasing loss aversion impacts
the threshold value of a pen for which the mug owner can still support keeping the mug
in equilibrium, i.e., how increasing individual gain-loss utility impacts the likelihood of
observing the endowment effect.
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Figure 3.2. Personal Equilibria as a function of the endowment distribution for Non-
conformers
Proposition 3.2. For a given λs , upkeep mug is increasing in λI
Proof.
dup
keep mug
dλI
= um(2 +pim(1−λs) +λs) (3.10)
This fraction is positive and constant for all values of pim and λs > 0
This means that increasing the level of individual gain-loss utility has an unam-
biguous positive effect on the likelihood of keeping one’s object. In figure 3.6 (appendix),
I illustrate graphically how the threshold value of a pen at which a mug owner is willing to
exchange a mug for the pen in equilibrium is increasing as the level of individual gain-loss
utility goes up.
3.2.5 Endogenizing The Distribution pim
So far, the analysis of behavior has assumed a fixed value of pim. However, it is
likely that in many settings this is an unrealistic assumption as the number of players may
98
be small and therefore pim is an endogenous object.6 To analyze the game when pim is
endogenous, I propose to define a social equilibrium which combines nash equilibrium with
KR’s personal equilibrium. This work is ongoing and is not required for establishing the
main results of this chapter. Nonetheless, demonstrating the existence (or non-existence)
of social equilibria is important for distinguishing this paper from other papers on reference
points since the reference point becomes dependent on the actions of others.
To show that a nash equilibrium exists, one must show that there exists at least one
fixed point of the best response functions. To do so, one can check that the conditions on
these functions under which a fixed fixed point theorem can be applied are satisfied. As we
have not reached that step, the remainder of section 3.2.5 assumes that these conditions are
satisfied and characterizes one of them in which all individuals are conformers. In particular,
one must show that the individuals are playing a best response to other individuals at
the nash equilibrium, and to be consistent with KR reference dependence, should also
be playing a personal equilibrium. It bears repeating that the remainder of section 3.2.5
is strictly preliminary work, and should not be treated with the same certainty of other
results in the paper.
Simultaneous Games
Under the assumption of common knowledge and rationality, I consider pure strategy
equilibria when individuals choose pens and mugs simultaneously. These equilibria look
similar to the types of equilibria found under standard coordination games. The conjecture
below attempts to prove that if all individuals in the population are conformists, then
there is a conforming equilibrium where everyone chooses the mug or everyone chooses the
pen under specific conditions on the parameter values up,λs,λI .
6A small literature exists on studying strategic interactions between expectations-based loss averse
players (Dato, Grunewald, Mu¨ller, and Strack, 2017; Shalev, 2000). Since the focus of this paper is
to study a very specific game in order to identify conforming and non-conforming preferences, drawing
general comparisons with the theoretical literature on this topic is beyond the scope of this work.
99
Conjecture 1. If everyone is a conformist, i.e. λs > 1 ∀i ∈ I, and expects to keep the
mug, then as long as up < λs+λI+13 and um = 1 , w.l.o.g., and λI > 1 then pi
∗(c1, ...., cN ) = 1
is an equilibrium. If everyone is a conformist, i.e. λs > 1 ∀i ∈ I, and expects to keep the
pen, then as long as up < λs+2λI+2 and um = 1 , w.l.o.g., and λI > 1 then pi
∗(c1, ...., cN ) = 1 is
an equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose everyone expects to keep the mug, then we need to show that:
U i(M,0|M,0,pi∗(c1, .., cN ) = 1)> U i(0,P |M,0,pi∗(c1, .., cN ) = 1) ∀i ∈ I
um+ (1−pim)(um−λsup)> up+pim(up−λsum) + (up−λIus)
since um is normalized to 1 and pim = 1
=⇒ 1> up+pim(up−λs) + (up−λI) =⇒ up < λs+λI + 13
As long as this condition on the up,λs,λI are satisfied, then everyone choosing mugs will
be an equilibrium. Since λs > 1 and under the assumption of loss aversion, λI > 1 this
condition says that utility of the pen should not be larger than the average of 1 , λs and
λI . Suppose everyone expects to keep the pen, then we need to show that:
U i(M,0|0,Ppi∗(c1, .., cN ) = 1)> U i(0,P |P,0,pi∗(c1, .., cN ) = 1) ∀i ∈ I
um+ (1−pim)(um−λsup) + (um−λIup)> up+pim(up−λsum)
since um is normalized to 1 and pim = 1
=⇒ 1 + 1−λIup > up+up−λs =⇒ up < λs+ 2
λI + 2
The conditions on the maximum value of up under which everyone choosing the mug is
an equilibrium, depend on whether individuals expect to keep the mug or the pen. If
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they expect to keep the pen, the maximum threshold of up at which the mug can be an
equilibrium comes down.
An analogous social equilibrium exists when pi∗(c1, ...., cN ) = 0 with different cutoff
values for up,λs,λI under which everyone is consuming a pen. In this case, up can be
lower than the normalized value of um = 1 and it still may be the case that individuals
consume pens in equilibrium if λI is large enough.
On going work is being done on finding and proving the other pure strategy
equilibria in this simultaneous game when different assumptions are made about the
distribution of social preferences. The main takeaway looking at simultaneous games is
that identification of social preferences is nearly impossible because it relies greatly on
assumptions of common knowledge. As a result, I look towards sequential games.
Sequential Games
I study a sequential game in which a group of subjects take turns choosing between
the pen and the mug, an environment that exactly mirrors the final experimental design I
chose. Consider a sequential game with a finite number of players, strategies, and outcomes.
The strategies are simply a choice of pen or mug from the set M,P given the proportion
of mugs pim chosen so far at every node in the game. The payoffs come from the following
utility function of each player, exactly as before:
u(c1|r,c2, c3, ....cN ) =
K∑
k=1
mk(c1k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Consumption Utility
+ 1
N −1
K∑
k=1
N∑
j=2
µo(mk(c1k)−mk(cjk))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Social Gain-Loss Utility
(3.11)
where I assume a linear social gain-loss utility function as before. Then , we have
the following proposition:
Proposition 3.3. Assume the following: (1) λI = 1 (2) Individuals know their own
conformity type, λs, but not the conformity types of others. (3) um = 1 and up is distributed
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symmetrically around 1 with finite variance. The optimal payoff maximizing strategy is
that conformers, for whom λs > 1, should choose the object that has been chosen most
frequently so far regardless of the types of future players. Non-conformers, for whom
λs < 1, should choose the object that has been chosen less frequently so far. If both objects
have been chosen equally in the past, one is indifferent between the two.
Proof. Proof by Induction.
1. Show that this holds for N=1:
(a) Starting at the last decision node, the average Nth player is assumed to be
indifferent between mugs and pens in expectation. She will choose the mug or pen based
on the following rule: Conformers, for whom λs > 1, will choose the mug if pim > 0.5 and
the pen if pim < 0.5. Correspondingly, non-conformers , for whom λs < 1 and pim > 0.5 will
choose the pen if pim < 0.5.
um+ (1−pim)(um−λsup)︸ ︷︷ ︸
social gain-loss
> up+pim(up−λsum)︸ ︷︷ ︸
social gain-loss
(3.12)
If pim = 0.5 then choose the object you like more. On average, assume that mugs
and pens are liked equally.
(b) Show that the optimal strategy is true for the N −1th player. The N −1th
player cares about his choice with regards to the final distribution of objects chosen. The
conjecture says that his optimal strategy is the same as the N th, i.e. the N −1th player
only responds to past choices. Consider two cases:
Case 1: If the N th player’s decision will not change which object is in the majority,
then the N −1th player should always follow the optimal strategy of the N th player in the
game, described in (1) above, as this is a dominant strategy. Stated differently, regardless
what happens in the remainder of the game, the object that will finally be in the majority
has already been determined, so it is a dominant strategy to then go with or against the
majority so far depending on one’s type (conformer or non-conformer).
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Case 2: Suppose the N th player’s choice will have an impact on which object is in
the majority. This can only happen if there is a tie in the proportion of objects chosen so
far, i.e. the current distribution is pim = 0.5 which also implies that the N −1th player’s
choice is the one that lead to pim = 0.5. This necessarily implies that the N −1th player
must have been a non-conformer.
2. Assume that the optimal strategy is true for the K+1th player and show that it
must be true for the Kth player.
The K+ 1th last player knows that if he were the Kth last player, the strategy of
ignoring the future, and only responding to players who have already moved, is optimal.
Therefore, the K+ 1th last player now only needs to calculate if the decisions of the Kth
last player affects his decision. By the logic of (1) above, the K+1th player only affects the
Kth last player’s strategy if her decision is going to affect which object is in the majority.
Again, this can only happen if the distribution thus far is pim = 0.5. By the logic in (2)
we know that the average Kth last player’s decision does not affect what the K+ 1th last
individual would do.
3.2.6 Strategy Method and Rationalizability
As a preview to the experimental design we end up using, we decided to have
subjects play a sequential game and used the strategy method to elicit choices at all possible
nodes of the game. This provides us with a rich enough data set to understand preferences
for conformity and non-conformity at the individual level, especially by analyzing choices
made at the end of the game one pim is fully resolved and is fixed. A second set of analyses
we do to test how consistent these choices are is to look at the rationalizability of choices
made at every node in the game.
We use two criterion for rationalizability: (1) Weak rationalizability, which is a
term we use to indicate the standard definition of rationalizability in a game in that there
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is some admissible belief on future play that is consistent with the choice made at that
node (Bernheim, 1984) (2) Strong rationalizability based on an assumption of consistency
in beliefs about future play. We define these in turn.
1. Weak Rationalizability
Define pism to be the proportion of mugs chosen from row 1 to row s and pifm to
be the proportion of mugs chosen at the final choice node of the game. At any node a,
if there exists a feasible final node such that the choice in that node is the same as the
choice in a then the choice is rationalizable. By ‘feasible” I mean that pifm subsumes pism.
As an intuitive example, let “M” be ”Mug” and “P” be “Pen”. If a person has
chosen M after seeing MM , then they must choose mug at one of the following final
distributions in the five player game, MMMM,MMMP,MMPP .
2. Strong Rationalizability:
Strong rationalizability puts some additional structure on beliefs about future game
play. Consider the case that an individual is a conformer based on the decisions made
in the last row and chooses M for a particular value of pism in an earlier row. If the
individual has forecasted E(pifm|pism), then in the next round, if they see another M , they
must necessarily believe that E(pifm|pis+1m ) ≥ E(pifm|pism) for s+ 1 > s, which means they
must choose a mug in this situation as well.
This definition of rationalizability is stronger than the first because it places more
consistency on the beliefs an individual can have after more uncertainty has resolved.
An example of a choice that does not violate weak rationalizability but violates strong
rationalizability is the following:
As an intuitive example, suppose an individual chose M after seeing M and P after
seeing P . Then, under consistent beliefs they must choose M after MM and P after PP .
However, under weak rationalizability they can choose M after MM and P after PP as
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long as it is consistent with some choice in the last round of the game.
3.3 Experimental Design
Our experimental design is a sequential game used to test the predictions of the
model. Subjects in the lab take turns choosing between a UC San Diego mug and a UC
San Diego pen and can observe the decisions chosen before them, but not those that will
be made subsequently. 7,8 In order to separately identify whether an individual likes
the pen or the mug from their preferences for conformity or non-conformity, individuals
are asked to make decisions using the strategy method and state their choices ex-ante,
before any choices are actually implemented, at every possible node in the game. This
allows the researcher to observe what the individual would do if everyone chose a mug, as
well as what the individual would do if everyone chose a pen, providing a way to identify
conformity and non-conformity.9,10 After choices are elicited, subjects are randomly
assigned a number between 1 and N, where N is the number of players in the game,
and decisions are implemented in the order of the assigned number and the experiment
concludes.
Figure 3.3 shows an example of this game when N = 3. Choices are elicited at
every decision node indicated by the rectangles.11
7the pens and mugs were procured at the UC San Diego bookstore and are roughly the same dollar
value.
8The experiment was designed and programmed in Otree.
9We considered alternate designs which increased the social pressure, e.g., assigning 18 individuals
a mug and 2 a pen asking individuals if they would like to trade. Making just one decision might have
reduced concerns of experimenter demand effects. However, the drawback to this would be not identifying
preferences for conformity and non-conformity at an individual level, and having much less to say about
outcomes from a given session, as discussed in section 2.6 on pure strategy equilibria in a simultaneous
move game. The sample size requirements to test our central prediction would also go up drastically.
10In the empirical strategy I discuss how I identify conformers and non-conformers using the definition
implied by our model.
11Note that the order in which decisions are made is irrelevant, i.e., if the previous choices have been
Mug and Pen, I do not separately ask what a participant prefers if the mug was chosen first and then the
pen, vs the pen was chosen first and then the mug. This reduces the number of decisions considered in
the 5-player version of the game that I ran but only by one for the 3-player version. Furthermore, the
order in which decisions are made is not something our theory predicts would matter.
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Figure 3.3. Game Tree - 3 players
Additional instructions included the following: (1) subjects are told that there
are enough mugs and pens for everyone so they should choose their preferred object for
each decision. This was to ensure that subjects were fully aware that there are no supply
constraint on the goods. A follow-up comprehension question was asked to verify that they
understood this. (2) subjects were given a chance to physically examine both objects at
the start of the experiment so that they had as much information about them as possible.
This minimizes any information asymmetries between subjects about the goods, thus
minimizing the channel of social learning. Even if social learning does exist, it would go
against us finding evidence of non-conformity. These design elements allowed us to isolate
the mechanisms for behavior that our model explores. An example of the decision screen
is shown in figure 3.4.
I test the above design in two versions of the game, a 3 player version and a 5 player
version where participants make 6 and 15 choices respectively. I chose small groups to
reduce the number of choices participants made since I was adopting the strategy method.
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Figure 3.4. Example of subject’s decision screen without endowment
3.3.1 With Endowment Experiment
In order to study whether the endowment effect persists in our social setting, a
version of the 3 player game is conducted with the additional feature that players are
randomly assigned one of the objects (either the mug or the pen) to start. I wanted to give
the endowment effect the best chance of being observed so I assigned an object at the start
of the experiment (right after subjects have had a chance to examine both objects). This
ensures that the assigned object stays with subjects for the duration of the experiment till
decisions are implemented. For this version of the experiment, subjects have either 6 or 9
choices to make since they make different choices depending on whether a mug assignee
or a pen assignee chose pen before them. Below is an example of one of the decisions a
subject could make if they were assigned the mug and the other two subjects were assigned
the pen.
As shown in figure 3.5, subjects are informed of the distribution of endowments in
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Figure 3.5. Example of subject’s decision screen with endowment
the room. They are also told what choices participants who have moved before them made
(and their initial endowments).12 The language used to discuss a subject’s endowment is
“ownership neutral”. Individuals endowed with the mug are referred to as “mug assignees”
and vice-versa for pens. This mirrors literature that has tried to use minimal ownership
language in studying the endowment effect in order to avoid priming or language confounds.
Theoretical Predictions and Hypotheses
Null Hypothesis
The null hypothesis is that in the stripped down exchange environment we’ve
created, the distribution of consumption goods should have no impact on a person’s
preferences over them. This is predicted by the following classes of models:
1. Classical Utility Theory: under standard utility theory individuals should choose
the good that they prefer
12This could potentially lead to an additional way in which people conform or not conform which is
that they emulate or deviate from the behavior of other individuals who started with the same object as
they did. This is beyond the scope of our model and requires a much larger data set to test.
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2. Social learning: since individuals get to examine both objects, I assume there is
not much room for social learning in our experiment. Even if there was, it would
go against finding evidence of non-conformity. Examples of social learning models
include (A. V. Banerjee, 1992).
3. Signaling Models and Status Goods: individuals buy certain consumption goods
because they signal status as in the models of conspicuous consumption (Veblen,
1899) or models of conformity generated by signaling (Bernheim, 1994). However,
given the nature of goods in our experiment, mugs and pens, and that individuals in
the room do not know each other or care about belonging to a particular group13 I
would not expect an effect of our experiment under these models.
4. Reference Dependence: Standard reference dependence models would only predict
an effect in our setting if the social distribution of objects had an impact on a
person’s reference point, but this fact has not been considered important in past
literature (Kahneman, Knetsch, and R. H. Thaler, 1991; R. Thaler, 1980; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1991).
Alternate Hypothesis
The alternate hypothesis is that individuals make social comparisons and may
respond to the social distribution, consistent with the predictions of our augmented
reference dependence model.
Without vs. With Endowment
There are two predictions, based on the proposed model, for how exchange behavior
might be affected by initially endowing subjects with one of the goods. Assuming that
individuals are loss averse with respect to departures from their endowment (λI > 1), as
has been typically found in past experiments, then I expect to find that:
13Of all the subjects who participated in the experiment, 2 pairs appeared to know each other.
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1. Individuals endowed with one of the goods will choose that good more, on average,
than individuals who were not endowed with it.
2. As an direct consequence of (1), I expect to see a lower proportion of individuals
displaying a social preference in the with endowment compared to the without
endowment treatments.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Data Collection
In total, data from 20 lab sessions was collected at UC San Diego broken down as
follows:
Table 3.1. Data Collection
# of sessions # of subjects # decisionsper person
5-player 10 50 15
3-player without endowment 5 15 6
3-player with endowment 5 15 6 or 9
3.4.2 Sample Balance
Across a set of demographic characteristics, I find no statistically significant differ-
ences between the subjects in the 3-player vs. 5-player version, as well as subjects in the
with and without endowment, showing that the randomization was successful (Table 3.2).
3.4.3 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy has three main components:
1. Identifying social preferences using decisions as the last player: First, I
provide evidence for the key prediction of our model: that the social distribution
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Table 3.2. Sample Balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female Age Year of College Intermediate Micro Non-chinese
5-player -0.218 0.453 -0.113 0.147 -0.060
(0.148) (0.631) (0.396) (0.129) (0.117)
3-player w/ endowment -0.067 0.467 -0.062 0.133 0.333
(0.183) (0.783) (0.500) (0.160) (0.145)**
Constant 0.667 20.267 3.133 0.133 0.200
(0.129) (0.554) (0.347) (0.113) (0.103)
Observations 79 80 79 80 80
P-value: 5 - player = 0 0.145 0.475 0.776 0.258 0.609
P-value: 3 - player w/ endowment = 0 0.716 0.553 0.902 0.407 0.024
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01***. The constant represents the mean in the
3-player without endowment version.
of an object has an impact on preferences for the object. To test this hypothesis
I calculate the proportion of individuals that can be identified as conformers or
non-conformers using only the decisions made when choosing as the last player in the
game. Decisions made as the last player provide the strongest test of identification
of social type because they require no assumptions on beliefs about future play since
pim and (1−pim) can no longer change.
2. Identifying social preferences across all decisions: Second, I examine the
rationalizability of decisions made by an individual at all rows of the game. I
use two notions of rationalizability as defined in the theory section 3.2.6. The
first is the standard game-theoretic notion of rationalizability, which I term “weak
rationalizability”, i.e., that there is some belief about future game play that could
justify a particular choice. The second is strong rationalizability based on assuming
some consistency of beliefs across rows of the game.
3. Testing presence of the endowment effect: Finally, I test whether the endow-
ment effect survives in our setting where individuals could potentially have a desire
to emulate or deviate from the behavior of others. Since subjects are randomized into
with and without endowment treatments, I would expect that ex-ante preferences
over the two goods are identical. Any difference in choice probabilities between the
two groups can only result from being endowed with a good.
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To carry out our empirical strategy for (1) and (2), I define below what decisions
are consistent with our model. For convenience, I will sometimes refer to the ”Nth player
choosing” as ”the Nth row”.
3.4.4 Identifying social preferences using decisions made as
the last player
To identify conformity and non-conformity as defined by our model, the following
definition holds true. I define it for the last row only in this section, but more generally in
the next section. Consider decisions made in the last row when pim is fixed. For individuals
who choose the same object for all decisions they faced, they are trivially consistent with
our model. For individuals who switch at least once between choosing a mug and a pen in
the last row, the following are necessary and sufficient conditions for consistency with our
model:
1. Consider an individual’s choices across a pair of symmetric nodes where symmetric
is defined as piim and (1−piim) for piim 6= 0.5. If an individual chooses the mug (pen)
in the first case and the pen (mug) in the other, the individual may be a conformer
(non-conformer) only if they choose the mug for all pijm ≥ piim and the pen for all
(1−pijm)≤ (1−piim).
2. If an individual prefers a mug and two values of piim and (1−piim), then they must
also prefer the mug for any value of pijm ≤ piim and (1−pijm)≥ (1−piim) . The same is
true if they prefer pen in both situations.
3. At piim = 0.5 the individual may choose the pen or mug.
5-player game
Table 3.3 shows a raw count of the possible combinations of choices I observe
for all individuals in the experiment when choosing as the the last player, player 5, in
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the 5-player version of the experiment. The columns indicate the possible choices that
previous subjects could have made, including the value of pim, while the rows indicate
the possible combinations of choices for the 5th player. For example, in column 2, I see
that the previous choices were MMMP (not in any particular order) and the value of
pim = .75. The left most column indicates which combinations of choices can be classified
into “conformers”, “non-conformers”, “random-choosers”, and “always chose pen or mug”.
“Conformers” and “non-conformers” based on the definition above, and our model. Anyone
inconsistent with our model is a “random chooser”. And for the purposes of our statistical
tests of random choice I distinguish these individuals from those who only chose the pen
or only chose the mug for all decisions.
In total there are 25 = 32 possible combinations for the last row. Two of those
combinations are for individuals who always choose the mug or always choose the pen. Of
the remaining possible ways in which a person can make choices, 4 of them are consistent
with the definition of conformity as outlined, and 4 of them are consistent with the
definition of non-conformity. The remaining 22 possible combinations are the “random
choosers”.
The data shows that 10 of the individuals made decisions consistent with the
definition of conformity or non-conformity used in the model. 5 of them appear to be
conformers, while 5 of them appear to be non-conformers. Of these individuals, only 3
of the 10 demonstrated social preferences when pim = 0.75, so it does seem that social
preferences are more likely under extreme values of pim.
The number of individuals that chose randomly using the strict definition that
they did not always choose the same object for the 5th row is only 6. However, this is
not a fully accurate representation of the number of random choosers, because 5 of the 34
individuals who chose only one object for the last row made different decisions in previous
rows. If we consider these individuals to be random choosers as well, it raises the number
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Table 3.3. Identifying Conformity and Non-conformity from last row decisions in 5 player
game
Possible Combinations of decisions by previous 4 players
MMMM MMMP MMPP MPPP PPPP Count
pim = 1 pim = .75 pim = .5 pim = .25 pim = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Always chose
mug or pen
M M M M M 20
P P P P P 14
Total 34
Choices consistent
with conformity
M M M M P 2
M M M P P 1
M M P P P
M P P P P 2
Total 5
Choices consistent
with non-conformity
P M M M M 3
P P M M M 1
P P P M M 1
P P P P M
Total 5
Choices classified
as random
M M M P M
M M P M M
M P M M M 1
M P M P M
M M P P M
M P P M M
M P P P M 1
M M P M P
M P M P P
M P M M P 2
M P P M P
P P P M P
P P M P P
P M P P P
P M P M P
P M M M P
P M M P P
P P M M P 1
P M P P M 1
P M M P M
P P M P M
P M P M M
Total 6
Table Notes: The columns indicate the possible choices that previous subjects could have
made for the 5 player game, including the value of pim, while the rows indicate the possible
combinations of choices for the 5th player. The left most column indicates which combinations of
choices can be classified into “conformers”, “non-conformers”, “random-choosers”, and “always
chose pen or mug”. “Conformers” and “non-conformers” based on the definition above, and our
model. Column 6 refers to the total number of observations in the 5-player version that made
that combination of choices. M indicates “Mugs” and P indicates “Pens”.
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of random choosers to 11. This is an important detail in doing our hypothesis tests.
In table 3.4, column 1, I show the main statistical test, which is whether or not
I can reject that our data may have been generated by individuals randomly choosing
between mugs and pens. To conduct such a test, I construct the null distribution by
assuming that the possible combinations of choices in the last row are the result of random
choices. If mugs and pens are equally likely to be chosen (a fact that cannot be rejected
from our data) then the likelihood of finding a combination of choices consistent with
conformity is 8/30 = .267 (I remove the individuals who always chose mug or pen from
the set of possible combinations otherwise it would be 8/32.) In total, 10 individuals
made choices consistent with a social preference from a sample of 21 individuals who did
not always choose the same object. Thus, using the probability of observing 10 or more
successes in 21 independent trials with probability of success of .267 is .032. I can therefore
reject the hypothesis that the data observed is random at the 5% level.
Overall, our findings in the 5-player game suggest that the distribution of objects
impacts ones preferences, consistent with the central prediction of our model.
3-player game
Turning our attention to the 3-player experiment without any initial endowment, I
conduct the same exercise in classifying conformity and non-conformity using data from
the last row of the game tree when all decisions by other players have been made (Table
3.5). Table 3.5 is an analogous version of table 3.4 but done for the 3-player experiment,
with columns indicating the possible previous choices subject could have observed and the
rows indicating possible combinations of the 3rd player. The possible previous choices are
“Mug, Mug”, “Mug, Pen” and “Pen, Pen” with corresponding values pim = 1,0.5,0. In total
there are 23 possible combinations of choices the 3rd player can make of which 4 of them
are consistent with our definition of conformity and non-conformity.
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Table 3.4. Hypothesis Tests for Random Choice
Number of observations in data under each type of choice
Types of Choices 5 player 3 player without endowment 3 playerwith endowment
using 3rd player
decisions
using 2nd & 3rd player
decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Chose Mug or pen
for all decisions 29 10 10 9
Choices consistent
with conformity (C) 5 1 1 0
Choices consistent
with non-conformity NC) 5 3 2 3
Choices classified
as random (R) 11 1 2 3
N = of trials =
C + NC + R) 21 5 5 6
k = # of success
C + NC 10 4 3 3
Proportion of individuals
identified as C or NC (k/N) 10/21 4/5 3/5 3/6
Probability of observing data
under random choice: 8/30 4/6 8/30 ***
Probability of obtaining
k or more successes 0.032 0.46 0.12 0.435
Table Notes: C refers to “conformers” , NC refers to “non-conformers and “R” refers to random choosers. The
columns indicate the version of the experiment. The first 4 rows of the left most column indicates the classification
of people into “types” based on their choices. The last row shows results of a hypothesis test (the p-value) that the
proportion of individuals classified as conformers and non-conformers could have been generated by random choice.
*** indicates the calculation done for 3 player with endowment which combines the probability of conformity and
non-conformity when making 3 random choices and when making 4 random choices since some individuals made
3 choices and some made 4 choices as the last player for the “with endowment” version.
Out of 15 subjects, 10 of them always chose the mug or always chose the pen (and
did so in prior rows of the game as well). Of the remaining subjects, 4 of them made
choices consistent with the definition of conformity or non-conformity used in the model.
3 of them appear to be non-conformers, while 1 of them appears to be a conformer. 1 of
them appears to be making random choices.
The chance of seeing the combinations of choices consistent with conformity and
non-conformity randomly is 4/6 which is significantly higher than in the 5-player game
where it was 8/30. I conduct the same hypothesis test for the 3-player game as I did
for 5-players. I use the binomial distribution to construct the probability of observing
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4 successes or greater in 5 trials when the probability of success is 4/6 or .6666. The
probability of such en event is 0.46 (as shown at the end of column 2 in table 4) and
therefore, I fail to reject the null that the social preferences observed in the 3-player game
could have been generated by random choice.
For the 3-player game with endowment, I find that 9 subjects chose either the mug
or the pen always. Of the remaining 6 individuals, 3 of them satisfied the definition of
non-conformity and the rest were random choosers (table 3.5). However, I fail to reject
that this data could be observed through random choice as shown in table 3.4, column 4.
Table 3.5. Identifying Conformity and Non-conformity from Last Row Decisions in 3
player game without endowment
Possible Combinations of decisions
by previous 2 players
Type of Choices
Made By 3rd player MM MP PP Count
pim = 1 pim = .5 pim = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Always chose
mug or pen
M M M 9
P P P 1
Total 10
Choices consistent
with conformity
M M P
M P P 1
Total 1
Choices consistent
with non-conformity
P M M 3
P P M
Total 3
Choices classified
as random
P M P 1
M P M
Total 1
Table Notes: The columns indicate the possible choices that previous
subjects could have made for the 3 player game, including the value of pim,
while the rows indicate the possible combinations of choices for the 3rd
player. The left most column indicates which combinations of choices can
be classified into “conformers”, “non-conformers”, “random-choosers”, and
“always chose pen or mug”. “Conformers” and “non-conformers” based on
the definition above, and our model. Column 6 refers to the total number of
observations in the 5-player version that made that combination of choices.
M indicates “Mugs” and P indicates “Pens”.
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3.4.5 Identifying social preferences using all decisions
In this section, I check if individuals who displayed social preferences in the last
row made decisions in prior rows that are rationalizable. I use the following criterion
as defined in section 3.2.6: (1) Weak rationalizability, which accords with the standard
definition of rationalizability in a game in that there is some admissible belief on future
play that is consistent with the choice made (Bernheim, 1984). (2) a stricter definition of
rationalizability I call strong rationalizability, based on a stronger assumption of consistency
in beliefs about future play.
Rationalizability Results
Table 3.6, columns 1 and 2 report the results of the two rationalizability tests for
individuals who made consistent choices in the last row. These are the individuals who
were either conformers or non-conformers discussed in the last section. The top panel
reports the results for the 5-player game and the bottom panel for the 3-player game
without endowment.
Out of 10 individuals in the 5-player game, only 2 individuals violated weak
rationalizability. However, when considering strong rationalizability, based on consistent
beliefs, 5 of the 10 individuals violate this notion, of which 4 were conformers. This
suggests that perhaps the preference for non-conformity is more stable.
Out of 4 individuals in the 3-player without endowment game, only 1 out of 4
individuals who was a non-conformer violated weak rationalizability. That same individual
is the only one who violated strong rationalizability as well by always selecting P when
making a choice as the 2nd player at all nodes, but choosing M after seeing a mug and a
pen as the third player.
One way to make our analysis of rationality more comprehensive is to count the
minimum number of choices one would need to change for each individual to such that
they would remain consistent with the model.
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Conformity and Non-conformity Across Rows of the game
Columns 3 to 10 of table 3.6 indicate whether an individual who was classified as
a conformer or non-conformer in the last row, displayed preferences for conformity and
non-conformity in earlier rows as well. This provides some indication of their beliefs about
future play.
Overall, I see that non-conformers are more likely to display preferences for non-
conformity at earlier stages of the game. In the 5-player versions, out of the 5 non-
conformers, 2 of them were non-conformers in every row, 1 of them was a non-conformer
for the last 3 rows, and 2 of them were only non-conformers in the last row. This gives us
an indication of how strong their preference for non-conformity was. Compared to the
non-conformers, out of the 5 conformers, only 1 was a conformer in every row, 1 was a
conformer in the last 3 rows, 1 of them was a conformer for the last 2 rows, and 2 of them
were a conformer for the last row. 14
Turning to the 3-player without endowment version, of the 4 individuals who were
identified as conformers or non-conformers when choosing as the last player I see that only
one of the non-conformers appeared to be a non-conformer choosing as both the second
and the third player.
What I learn from the analysis of rationalizability is that non-conformity preferences
appear more stable in the data relative to conformity preferences as non-conformers made
less violations. I also find suggestive evidence that non-conformers are more confident in
the sequences of choices they will observe at the end of the game. However, there is not
much evidence of greater non-conformity than conformity when pim = 0.75 in the data (a
difference of one observation).
14In terms of individuals switching between choices that reveal conformity and non-conformity across the
game, I find only 2 instances of it across the 17 individuals who identified as a conformer or non-conformer
in all the experiments run.
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Table 3.6. Violations of Rationality Across All Decisions - 3 and 5 player
ID Type inlast row
Violation of
Rationalizability
(1 = Violation,
0 = No Violation)
Violation of
Belief Consistency
(1 = Violation,
0 = No Violation)
Conformer = 1 Non-conformer = 0 SwitchC/NC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Decision Row
2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5
5 player
1 NC 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
2 NC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
3 NC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
4 NC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
5 NC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
6 C 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
7 C 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
8 C 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
9 C 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
10 C 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Total Violations 2 5 1
3 player without endowment
11 NC 0 0 0 0 - - 0 1 - - 0
12 NC 0 0 0 0 - - 1 1 - - 0
13 NC 1 1 0 0 - - 0 1 - - 0
14 C 0 0 0 1 - - 0 0 - - 0
Total Violations 1 1 0
Table notes: “NC” refers to Non-conformers, “C” refers to Conformers. The top panel calculates rationality for the
5-player version and the bottom panel for the 3-player version. Column 1 indicates whether an individual violated the
general notion of rationalizability, and column 2 indicates violation of the stricter notion of rationality where beliefs across
rows must be consistent. Columns 3-10 indicate whether the individual indicated choices that would classify them as C or
NC when choosing as the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, etc. player, as indicated by the heading “decision-row”. Switch C/NC refers to
whether the individuals switched between conformer and non-conformer between rows.
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3.4.6 Endowment Effect Under Social Comparisons
One of the motivating questions of the paper is to test whether the endowment
effect survives in an environment with social pressures to exchange. Under our model,
as the proportion of individuals who own a particular object increases, social preferences
could lead to a dampening of the endowment effect. I examine this by comparing the
proportion of times individuals choose mug (pen) when they are randomly endowed with
one, to the proportion of times it is chosen in the treatments without any endowments.
Since individuals are randomly assigned to treatments, I assume that any difference in
these proportions must come from being endowed with the object. I present the results in
table 3.7.
As can be seen in column 1 which looks at only the 3-player version, the proportion
of mug choices for individuals who were ”endowed with mug” is approximately -11.5 p.p. ,
and insignificant (p = .51) showing that subjects who were endowed with the mug were
no more likely to choose the mug than subjects who were not given any endowment. In
column 2, I conduct the same analysis, but also add individuals from the 5-player version.
We see that it now appears that individuals endowed with the mug are more likely to
choose it compared to the no endowment treatment. However, this is primarily because
individuals in the 5-player treatment happened to choose the mugs less than the 3-player
treatment overall. I account for this in columns (3) and (4), first by explicitly controlling
for fixed effects, and then by weighting the observations by the inverse probability that
they are included based on the number of observations for that version of the experiment.
I find that while the point estimate in column 4 is positive, individuals endowed with the
mug are about 6.3 p.p. more likely to keep the mug, but this is insignificant (p = .69).
Thus, this could reflect a lack of power to detect the endowment effect, but combined with
the other evidence, it is more suggestive that the endowment effect is crowded out.
The identical analysis is conducted in columns 4-8 for the likelihood of choosing
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pen conditional on being endowed with the pen. In column 4, restricted to the 3-player
version, I find that individuals do appear to be more likely to choose the pen given they
are endowed with it. However, given the result on mugs being -11.5 p.p. for this same
sample, taken together, this appears to be just a difference in preferences in consumption
utility between pens and mugs as opposed to evidence of an endowment effect. Columns
5-8 where I incorporate data from version 5 illustrate that being endowed with a pen leads
to no greater likelihood of choosing the pen, and I would consider this a null result.
Finally, the proportion of conformers and non-conformers found in the 3-player
version without endowment is .8 ( 4 out of 5) while in the with endowment it is .5 (
3 out of 6). While this is a large difference in magnitude, the sample is too small to
demonstrate whether endowing subjects with a good lowers the amount of conformity and
non-conformity observed.
Table 3.7. Evidence of an Endowment Effect
Dependent Variable : Chose Mug = 1 Chose Pen = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Endowed with mug -0.115 0.075 -0.115 0.063
(0.172) (0.155) (0.169) (0.155)
Endowed with pen 0.204 -0.014 0.014 0.026
(0.201) (0.185) (0.197) (0.185)
Version 5 = 1 -0.213 0.213
(0.103)** (0.103)**
Constant 0.767 0.576 0.767 0.589 0.233 0.424 0.233 0.411
(0.086) (0.054) (0.085) (0.052) (0.087) (0.054) (0.085) (0.052)
Observations 156 906 906 906 138 888 888 888
Versions only 3 all all all only 3 all all all
Probability Weights For Version No No No Yes No No No Yes
R-squared 0.016 0.002 0.018 0.002 0.045 0.000 0.017 0.000
P-value Starting with object = 0 0.509 0.629 0.497 0.687 0.321 0.941 0.303 0.887
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** Unit of observation in all regressions is at the
individual-choice level. Regressions are all clustered at the participant level.
The explanation I consider for not finding an endowment effect is the one I provide
in this paper, which is that preferences to conform and not conform seem to dominate.
However, an alternate explanation is the one put forth by (Goette, Graeber, Kellogg,
and Sprenger, 2018) which is that if there is heterogeneity in loss aversion , that is, if
there are some individuals for whom individual gain-loss utility, λI < 1, then this would
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lead to a desire to exchange their endowed object. These subjects can be thought of as
“gain-seeking”. Thus, sample sizes in typical studies of the endowment effect are an order
of magnitude too small to detect it, even when the proportion of loss averse individuals is
larger than those who are “gain-seeking”.
3.5 Discussion and Further Work
Overall, the paper presents two pieces of evidence on how the social distribution
of consumption impacts preferences: (1) A small but statistically significant portion of
individuals respond to other people’s choices in a way that is consistent with a utility
function in which individuals compare their consumption bundle to others around them.
(2) When compared to a treatment where individuals are initially endowed with an object,
individuals are no less likely to prefer the object than in the no-endowment case, although
the study is underpowered to detect small endowment effects.
While I find a small overall treatment effect as only 22% of individuals demonstrate
a social preference in our sample, one of the questions for future work is what would
happen if the social pressure we implemented in our experiment was increased. Instead of
using the strategy method, where individuals state their preference at all possible nodes
of the game, I could implement a design where individuals take turns making a single
decision in real time so that only one of the games potential outcomes is realized. Imagine
perhaps that individuals physically go up to the front of the room and choose between the
pen and mug showing others what they have done. This may increase the amount of social
preference observed overall, but it could potentially also change the ratio of conformers to
non-conformers, as individuals may feel a stronger urge to conform.
One concern that has been brought up about our design is the possibility of an
experimenter demand effect as under the strategy method, subjects are asked choose
between the mug and the pen several times. The concern is that this may lead them to
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think that the experimenter wants them to make different decisions each time. However, I
argue that even if this were true, it is not clear that subjects have any idea what model
the experimenter has in mind or what a“correct” decision is. As such, I believe that
conditional on there being variation in subject’s answers, we are likely to be learning
something valuable about preferences for conformity and non-conformity at the individual
level. If anything, I believe the results present a lower bound of the true extent of social
preferences in an exchange setting since the strategy method itself may be the most subtle
treatment one could do, but one is best suited for identification.
3.6 Conclusion
There is substantial evidence that economic choices are greatly influenced by the
actions of our peers in a variety of domains, including education (Lazear, 2001), firm
decisions (Kaustia and Rantala, 2015), paying taxes (Perez-Truglia and Troiano, 2015),
and energy consumption (Allcott, 2011), to name a few. In this paper, I focus on an
environment which has largely ignored these social factors, behavior in exchange settings.
Reference dependence models have typically been used to study behavior in these settings
and have focused on explaining the endowment effect, the finding that individuals’ initial
ownership of a good increases its valuation. I provide evidence that in a standard exchange
setting, individual preferences over consumption goods are a function of the observed
distribution of consumption in society. I find that a small, but significant portion of
individuals are conformers, displaying a preference for the object that has been chosen
the most, and an equally large number are non-conformers, showing a preference for the
object chosen least.
To explain the findings, I present a model of reference dependence with an additional
reference point to explain why individuals may respond to the social distribution. Our
model abstracts from social learning and social signaling, arguing that the desire to
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conform or not conform is driven simply by the gain-loss utility derived from making social
comparisons. Our experiment controls for social learning, by allowing subjects to examine
both objects at the start, and for social signaling, by having subjects play the game against
anonymous peers. This suggests that even in a basic exchange environment, individuals
display social preferences. Additionally, contrary to most models and empirical results
that find evidence mostly in favor of conformity, I find that I cannot reject equality of the
ratio of non-conformers to conformers in our sample. This constitutes further evidence
that perhaps the mechanisms that drive emulation and deviation in our setting are indeed
different from the mechanisms that drive social preference in other settings where social
learning and social signaling are likely to play bigger roles.
A second result concerns the existence of the endowment effect in a social setting.
In an additional treatment where individuals are first endowed with an object and then
provided information on the social distribution, the endowment effect appears to dampen.
Individuals endowed with a given object are no more likely to choose it than the comparison
group who were not assigned anything. However, given recent findings in the literature
that not all individuals are loss averse and some may have a preference to trade away
their assigned object, our study may be underpowered to detect small endowment effects
(Goette, Graeber, Kellogg, and Sprenger, 2018).
Overall, our results suggest that a preference to emulate or deviate from the
consumption of choices of others could mitigate exchange asymmetries in settings where
the endowment effect is observed. This may be applicable to recent studies that show
endowment effects in applied settings. For example, Carney, Lin, Kremer, and Rao (2018)
provide evidence from a field-experiment that the endowment effect causes borrowers to
dislike taking loans in which the collateral is an asset they already own and is therefore
already a part of their reference point. While the prescribed solution is to collateralize
loans using the new asset, our paper suggests that simple information on the the choices
others have made may reduce the endowment effect as individuals compare themselves to
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the group. However, our data suggests that information must be more subtle and specific
than that. In order to induce action “a” by a conformer, one should show information that
more people are taking the action, while inducing action “a” by a non-conformer requires
providing information that fewer people are taking the action. In general, a large portion
of non-conformers in a sample could explain the muted effects of providing information on
other people’s behavior, and it may be important to know what the composition of social
preferences is in a given population.
Chapter 3, in full is currently being prepared for submission for publication of the
material. The dissertation author, Vinayak Alladi was the primary investigator and author
of this material.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Comparative Statics of Social KR Model
Changing the value of individual loss aversion
Figure 3.6. Impact of Changes in Individual Gain-Loss Utility on Personal Equilibrium
Thresholds
Comparative Statics of Equilibrium Threshold for Pen Owners
dup
keep pen
dpim
= um(λs−1)(λI +λs+ 4)(1 +pim(1−λs) +λs+λI)2 (3.13)
3.7.2 Preference Consistency
One question of interest amongst individuals who did not always choose the same
object is whether or not they are answering completely randomly or something can still be
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learned about their underlying preferences, as this speaks to how subjects thought about
the questions they were being asked.
To do this, I focus on the decisions made when the proportion of mugs chosen thus
far by previous subjects is 50%.15 The columns of table 9 show the proportion of times
subjects choose mug in these 50-50 situations while the rows show the percentage of times
the mug is chosen overall across all situations. This is done for the 5-player and 3-player
games combined. As can be seen, there is a strong correlation between choosing mug
more often in the 50-50 cases and choosing mugs overall. This serves as a check for the
consistency of our interpretation of the preferences being expressed in the data.
Table 3.8. Correlation between choices at a 50-50 distribution and other choices
Proportion of Times
Mug Chosen
Chooses Mugs at least 50%
of the time when proportion of mugs
chosen thus far is 50%
0 0.333 0.5 0.666 1
6.7% 1 0 0 0 0
13.3% 1 0 0 0 0
16.7% 1 0 0 0 0
20.0% 1 0 0 0 0
26.7% 1 0 0 0 0
33.3% 1 0 0 0 0
40.0% 0 1 0 0 0
46.7% 0 0 0 2 0
50.0% 0 0 1 0 1
53.3% 0 0 0 2 0
60.0% 0 0 0 2 2
66.7% 0 0 0 0 2
73.3% 0 0 0 0 2
80.0% 0 0 0 1 1
93.3% 0 0 0 0 3
6 1 1 7 11
3.7.3 With Endowment Last Row
15This occurs twice in the 3-player game, when no decisions have been made and when one person has
chosen a mug and one person has chosen a pen, and three times in the 5-player, with the addition of two
people have chosen mugs and two have chosen pens.
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